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ABSTRACT. As the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) passes its fortieth anniversary and
faces upcoming constitutional challenges to its recent renewal, a growing number of liberals and
conservatives, once united in support, now share deep reservations about it. This Article argues
that the growing skepticism about the VRA and majority-minority districting is misguided by a
simplistic and impoverished account of electoral competition in American politics. Electoral
competition should be judged with reference to the ultimate ends it is intended to produce-
more democratic debate, greater civic engagement and participation, and richer political
discourse - all of which are generated by a deeper first-order competition among political leaders
that this Article describes as "democratic contestation." This Article offers democratic
contestation, in place of electoral competition, as a basic value in the law of democracy and as the
foundation for a new theory that helps reconcile approaches to race, representation, and political
competition. A theory of democratic contestation shifts the normative focus from the pluralist
absorption with which groups get what from politics to a new focus on the tenor and quality of
political competition among leaders. When viewed through a theory of democratic contestation,
the VRA is crucially procompetitive in the broader sense of democratic contestation. By carving
out safe majority-minority districts, the VRA may break the discursive stasis of racial
polarization in which politics revolve around the single axis of race. A theory of democratic
contestation reveals how majority-minority districts may energize the process of democratic
contestation and enable an internal discourse of ideas that moves beyond the racially polarized
divide, an otherwise inadvisable move in the face of racially polarized opposition. A theory of
democratic contestation thus demands a reevaluation of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
LULAC v. Perry and provides a new understanding of the renewed VRA going forward in the
modern world of national partisan competition.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court once criticized the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),'
widely regarded as the most successful intervention for racial minorities during
the last century,2 as representing merely the "politics of second best."3
Although the VRA was needed long ago to dismantle the Jim Crow South, the
Court's recent decisions reflect the view that the VRA today threatens to
impose representational guarantees in place of, and often preemptive of,
political resolution through electoral competition and interest group
pluralism.4 As the VRA passes its fortieth anniversary and faces upcoming
constitutional challenges to its recent renewal,' liberals and conservatives once
united in their support for the VRA have come to share the Court's concerns. 6
As Richard Pildes aptly put it, "the quiet era of the VRA now appears at an
end."
7
Electoral competition has become popular as the structural priority for
election law, in place of representational guarantees like the VRA. 8 The VRA
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973j (West 2007).
2. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power To Extend and Amend the
Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1, 2 (2007) ("The [Voting Rights] Act is rightly
celebrated as the cornerstone of the 'Second Reconstruction.'").
3. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (quoting BERNARD GROFMAN, LISA
HANDLEY, & R!cHARD G. NIEMI, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING
EQUALITY 136 (1992)).
4. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2613-23
(2006); Georgia v. Ashcroft, S39 U.S. 461,479-91 (2003).
s. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. lO9-246, 12o Stat. 577 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 to 197 3bb-1 (West 20o6)).
6. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1731 (2004); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 20o3 Term-
Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 29, 68-70 (2004);
Abigail Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 41, 72-76 (2007).
7. Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, io8 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1361 (1995) (reviewing QUIET
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)).
8. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, So STAN. L. REv. 643, 646 (1998) ("Only through an appropriately
competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of democratic politics be
realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and
views of citizens."); Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented
Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 685, 686, 691-95 (2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
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carves out, at least when conditions of racial polarization prevail, majority-
minority districts9 that tend to be overwhelmingly Democratic, with little
intradistrict electoral competition from Republicans, by virtue of the
Democratic partisanship of African American and Latino voters.' Particularly
since the South has developed two-party competition that resembles what
many view as "normal politics,"" the establishment of majority-minority
districts clashes with the normative sensibilities of an increasing number of
commentators and courts. Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes argue that
courts instead should self-consciously focus on regulating electoral competition
with the dominant structural aim of assuring a "robustly competitive partisan
environment."'2 Not surprisingly, they are among the new group of skeptics 3
about the continuing value of the VRA and the "legal requirement of 'safe
minority districting.""4 Issacharoff and Pildes argue that safe majority-
minority districts under the VRA reduce electoral competition and thus may
run counter to the VRA's purposes in the context of contemporary politics.
The Supreme Court also seemed to prioritize electoral competition under
the VRA in its review of the 2003 Texas congressional redistricting in LULAC
v. Perry.'" The Court focused on three districts that were reconfigured in 2003,
each of which faced VRA-related challenges. What was striking in the Court's
handling of the VRA claims is that the Court decided to restore old District 23,
the only challenged VRA district in which the racial minority had no guarantee
of electing its candidate of choice. Despite a "politically active" Latino
electorate, old District 23 consistently elected a Republican representative over
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)) (stating that competitive theorists give electoral
competition "pride of place" and priority among democratic values).
9. "Majority-minority" districts are districts in which African Americans or Latinos as a bloc
constitute a majority of the population.
1o. See Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 88 (noting that courts generally order majority-minority districts as a
remedy under the VRA); Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting and Competitive Districts, in
THE MARKETPLACE OF DEMOCRACY: ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 222,
233 (Michael P. McDonald & John Samples eds., 20o6) (noting the Democratic partisanship
of African American and Latino voters).
ii. Pildes, supra note 6, at 84.
12. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 8, at 717.
13. See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593, 645-46
(2002); Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 8, at 704-07; Pildes, supra note 6, at 95-99; Richard
H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1607 (1999).
14. Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1139, 1140 (2007).
15. 126 S. Ct. 2594 (20o6).
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the energetic opposition of Latino voters in close, competitive elections.
Equally odd, the Court sustained the dismantling of old District 24 and ordered
the dismantling of new District 25, two electorally safe districts where the
minority communities successfully elected their candidates of choice. However,
the Court's handling of the Texas redistricting may be explained by a growing
judicial preference for electoral competition under the VRA. 6 In short, the
Supreme Court may be joining with the greater skepticism about VRA
majority-minority districting and its anticompetitive electoral effects.
This Article argues that this growing skepticism about the VRA is based on
an impoverished account of political competition. Electoral competition is only
one form of political competition. Even if the VRA and safe majority-minority
districting cut against electoral competition, a structural commitment to
competition in politics ought to transcend the simple maintenance of
competitive elections between the major parties. Electoral competition should
be judged with reference to the ultimate ends it is intended to produce- more
democratic debate, greater civic engagement and participation, and richer
political discourse -all of which are implicated by a deeper notion of political
competition among political leaders that I term "democratic contestation."
Electoral competition serves only as a proxy, a means to these greater
democratic ends.
This Article offers democratic contestation as a basic value to be pursued in
the law of democracy and the foundation for a theory that helps sort through
and reconcile approaches to race, representation, and political competition
under the VRA. Democratic contestation represents the basic competitive
process among leaders to present the mass public with meaningful, attractive
choices, not just about two candidates, but about what they want from
government and the way they think of politics. Democratic contestation is the
deliberative competition among political leaders to shape and frame the
public's understandings about elective politics, public policy, and civic affairs.
It encompasses the process by which leaders dare, force, and challenge the
public to think about politics. Electoral competition is only one prominent
element of this larger competition among political leaders for sociopolitical
influence-a healthy process of democratic contestation that draws in and
engages the public in that process to win the hearts and minds of citizens. 7
16. See Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right To Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1164-65 (2007).
17. Throughout this Article, I purposely adopt a functional rather than status-related definition
of the term "leader." I distinguish leaders only by what they try to do -coordinate and
organize mass politics toward any sociopolitical ends-and not at all by who they are, what
they have, or what they represent culturally, politically, or ideologically. In previous work, I
have referred to political leaders as "elites," drawing upon political science jargon to identify
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Although electoral competition generally coincides with democratic
contestation, it also diverges in many instances that inform the way that the
law of democracy should develop, particularly under the VRA.
The Article proposes a basic shift in the level of analysis from electoral
competition among politically relevant groups, principally the major political
parties, to a new, deeper focus on the more fundamental political competition
among leaders to create and ultimately determine the character of the
alignments that emerge as politically relevant in the first place. Of course,
many commentators have debated the merits of different forms of electoral
competition in various settings, whether the primary or general election,
intradistrict or interdistrict, or within or across institutions like parties and
branches of government. These debates, however, so far fail to connect those
different forms of electoral competition to the deeper aspiration -represented
by democratic contestation -that they all should seek to promote. This Article
seeks to reorient the usual preference for electoral competition, in a way that
ought to influence debate across all election law, by identifying and articulating
the basic value of democratic contestation that underlies electoral competition.
Democratic contestation is both a means and an end of healthy democratic
politics. It is a means in the sense that the process of democratic contestation
should lead to richer, more legitimate and popular political outcomes that
better respond to the hopes and needs of the sociopolitical community. But
critically, democratic contestation is also an end in itself. The process by which
the community entertains and confronts choices about how to define its
politics is a crucial function of democracy, justly celebrated by democratic
theory. It is a central tenet of a theoty of democratic contestation that political
leaders initiate agenda setting and frame the basic questions and alternatives in
the process of democratic contestation. A theory of democratic contestation
values the process of democratic contestation as a fundamental aim of the law
of democracy and therefore brings a new theoretical perspective to old views
and debates. *
political entrepreneurs who seek to lead the public, form groups, and initiate collective
action for political ends. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring
Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLAL. REV. 1141, 1162-65
(2003); see also JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 6 (1992)
(defining elites as "persons who devote themselves full time to some aspect of politics or
public affairs"). In referring to political leaders or elites, I do not mean to invoke an
explicitly class-based or neo-Marxist definition of elites. See generally C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE
MARXISTS 117-18 (1962); Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lauyers: The Therapeutic as
Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1O62 (1996) (book review). Instead, I mean in this Article
only to indicate self-identified political entrepreneurs, regardless of social, cultural, or
economic position, who effectively lead public opinion and help coordinate collective action.
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Democratic contestation offers a synthesis of democratic theory, bridging
quite disparate elite and participatory perspectives. A theory of democratic
contestation is distinctly leader-centered in that it envisions at its heart robust
political competition among political leaders as the engine of democratic
politics. It takes for granted that mass democracy, given the challenges of
collective action, depends critically on the coordinating entrepreneurship of
political leaders. The process of democratic contestation helps define the
political alignment of the polity and constitutes the substantive politics for the
community. However, diverging from traditional elite perspectives, a theory of
democratic contestation prizes leadership competition precisely because that
competition makes possible the central goal of promoting mass participatory
politics. A process of democratic contestation draws in the mass public, makes
political debate accessible, presents civic choices to the public, and instigates a
broader discourse about the political future of the community. At the
individual level, this process enables citizens to constitute political identity by
engaging in politics and developing their particular sensibilities about public
affairs. The process of democratic contestation thus integrates the personal
self-constitution for individual citizens at the micro level and the collective self-
constitution for the sociopolitical community at the macro level. The theory of
democratic contestation that I introduce here, and plan to develop in future
work, does not defy the consensus that electoral competition is valuable as a
general matter over the great range of instances. Electoral competition is
generally consistent as a goal with a theory of democratic contestation, serving
as a regular catalyst for leadership mobilization and mass political
participation. Indeed, a theory of democratic contestation helps clarify why
electoral competition is valuable, by exploring its normative ends, but it also
helps identify those instances when electoral competition is less useful in
achieving those ends, as in the case of racial polarization under the VRA.
Once viewed through a theory of democratic contestation, the VRA can be
seen as crucially procompetitive in the broader sense of democratic
contestation, rather than narrowly as electorally anticompetitive. The VRA
applies most forcefully under conditions of racial polarization where white and
minority voters are locked into opposed voting blocs along the dominant axis
of race. The VRA, by breaking this racial stasis and carving out safe majority-
minority districts, may liberate the process of democratic contestation in both
the white and minority communities. The majority-minority district releases
both groups from the overriding pressure, imposed by racial polarization, to
maintain racial in-group cohesion and therefore to avoid exploring concerns
that may divide them along nonracial lines. For this reason, the majority-
minority district can facilitate fraternal competition within the minority group
and encourage engagement in an internal discourse that would be impossible,
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or at least inadvisable, in the face of racially polarized opposition. Politics, by
virtue of the racial guarantee," moves beyond race and racial polarization.
Majority-minority districting basically removes race from intradistrict politics,
counterintuitively, by districting with race as the primary consideration.
As a result, if the Supreme Court is interested in promoting political
participation and civic engagement consistent with a theory of democratic
contestation, its handling of the Texas districts in LULAC v. Perry may be
entirely wrong. The majority-minority district may be a positive instrument,
enabling the leaders and citizens of the racial minority to engage in a broader
competition of ideas, through a process of democratic contestation, moving
beyond the racially polarized divide that dominates politics in the absence of
the majority-minority district.19 The electoral safety of the majority-minority
18. The Court has explained that the Voting Rights Act secures for racial minorities an equality
of political opportunity to elect, not a guarantee of electoral success. See, e.g., Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 n.1 (1994) (distinguishing "equality of opportunity" from "a
guarantee of electoral success for minority-preferred candidates"). But the typical majority-
minority district as ratified by courts provides a reasonable assurance of electoral success.
The government produces the aforementioned racial guarantee, in the form of safe majority-
minority districts, through the use of facially neutral classifications drawn by district lines
on a geographic map. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote,
114 HARv. L. REV. 1663, 1695-96 (2001) ("[W]e cannot look at a district line and
immediately conclude that the government has employed a racial classification .. ").
Nonetheless, the obvious reference to racial considerations in drawing district lines led the
Court to apply strict scrutiny in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and later cases and
strike down as unconstitutional majority-minority districts where race served impermissibly
as a "predominant, overriding factor" in the redistricting process. See Michael S. Kang,
When Courts Won't Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and a Structural Approach to the Law
of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 11o8-1o (2007) (describing Shaw and the introduction
of the predominant factor standard). The Court, however, effectively made clear that race-
consciousness in districting tailored to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as described
above, does not violate Shaw. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) ("Strict
scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of
race."); Miller v. Johnson, 5i5 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) ("Redistricting legislatures will, for
example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not follow that race
predominates in the redistricting process."); see also Bush, 517 U.S. at 990-95 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Even Justices Scalia and Thomas later noted that they agreed the Voting Rights
Act provides a compelling state interest under Shaw. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2667 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part).
19. A separate debate, only indirectly implicated here, is whether majority-minority districts
optimally advance the policy preferences of the racial minority group. Compare CAROL M.
SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN
CONGRESS 200-05 (1993), Charles Cameron, David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Do
Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 794 (1996), and Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley & David Lublin, Drawing
Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical Evidence, 79 N.C. L.
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district, disdained by the Court in LULAC, might empower the racial minority
to debate, deliberate, and decide internally about public policy and ideology,
about priorities and concerns. For the racial minority, electoral politics
transforms from racially polarized outcomes at the polls to the more optimistic
question of who the group's candidate of choice will be and what type of
politics the community wishes to develop as its own.
Part I describes the debate over the VRA and the basic tension between
electoral competition and safe majority-minority districting under the VRA.
Part I explains how the Court appeared to resolve the VRA claims in LULAC v.
Perry by emphasizing and acting on a structural preference for electoral
competition over other democratic values. Next, Part II introduces a theory of
democratic contestation- a fresh account of democratic politics with particular
focus on the role of political leaders in generating political discourse and action.
Part II explains that a theory of democratic contestation offers a new
understanding of representation, electoral competition, and the normative aims
of democratic politics. Finally, Part III applies a theory of democratic
contestation to the problems of racial polarization and the VRA. It argues that a
theory of democratic contestation provides a powerful rationale for majority-
minority districting and challenges the logic of the Court's handling of the
VRA claims in LULAC v. Perry. Part III contends that the Court's new
requirement of "cultural compactness" under the VRA is particularly
counterproductive if the Court is serious about the normative aims emphasized
in L ULAC. The Article concludes by arguing, based on a theory of democratic
contestation, against the popular movement toward coalition districts as
substitutes for majority-minority districts under the VRA.
I. ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE NEW ERA OF THE VRA
A. The VRA, Representation, and Electoral Competition
Legal and political communities, once overwhelmingly supportive of the
VRA, now divide on the question whether the VRA does more harm than good
REV. 1383 (2001), with David Lublin, Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation:
A Critique of "Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in
Congress?," 93 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 183 (1999), Kenneth W. Shotts, Does Racial Redistricting
Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes? Policy Preferences of Southern Representatives in the 198os
and 199os, 65 J. POL. 216 (2003), and Kenneth W. Shotts, Racial Redistricting's Alleged Perverse
Effects: Theory, Data, and "Reality," 6S J. POL. 238 (2003). Political scientists disagree about
whether majority-minority districts undercut the substantive interests of the racial minority
at the level of the entire legislature by packing voters of color into a few districts and thereby
bleaching the rest of the jurisdiction toward Republican control.
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in today's political world." The recent debate over renewal of section 5 of the
VRA and the Supreme Court's decision in LULAC v. Perry were revealing
about the future of the VRA, as the renewed VRA heads toward inevitable
challenges in court. 1 The controversy is whether the successes of the decades-
old VRA in opening the doors to minority political gains in the South and
beyond have undermined the very rationales for its existence.
The VRA was designed to end African American disenfranchisement in
what was then a one-party South. The Democratic Party dominated Southern
politics completely for nearly a century through the VRA's passage in 1965.22 In
the complete absence of partisan competition, the Democratic Party had no
desire to destabilize its one-party hegemony by ending the historical
disenfranchisement of African Americans. There were no incentives for
Democrats even to consider broadening their constituency or pursuing African
American votes. What is more, in the context of the one-party South, the
VRA's intervention did little, at least immediately, to shift partisan advantage
or otherwise entrench either party any further.23 The VRA simply opened the
door to African American representation within the Democratic Party, rather
than offer opportunities for partisan mischief.
To the degree that the VRA's effectiveness was premised on nonpartisan
neutrality in a one-party Democratic South, however, the VRA undermined
that very premise in impressive fashion after 19657 4 The VRA's empowerment
of African American voters quickly influenced the Democratic agenda and
incentivized southern Democrats to address African American political
interests.2 George Wallace, who famously declared his dedication to
2o. Compare Issacharoff, supra note 6, and Pildes, supra note 6, with Karlan, supra note 2, and
Michael J. Pitts, Let's Not Call the Whole Thing OffJust Yet: A Response to Samuel Issacharoffs
Suggestion To Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REv. 605 (2005).
21. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 1730-31; Nathaniel Persily, Options and Strategies for
Renewal of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 49 How. L.J. 717 (2006); Nathaniel Persily, The
Promise and Piyfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174 (2007) [hereinafter Persily,
Promise and PitfalIs] ; Pitts, supra note 20.
22. See generally PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA
(1999); V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949); J. MORGAN
KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 188o-191o (1974).
23. See Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 1730-31.
24. See Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 5o VAND. L.
REV. 291, 313-22 (1997) (describing the collapse of the New Deal coalition in the South after
the passage of the VRA).
25. See ROBERT J. COTrROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUcATION: CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 235-36 (2003).
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"segregation forever" before the VRA's passage, could be found campaigning
actively for African American votes a decade later. 6 The VRA was so effective
at engaging African American interests, tabled completely in the Jim Crow
South, that it triggered a dramatic partisan realignment of the electorate.
7
During the thirty years following the VRA's enactment, white conservatives
fled the Democratic Party in waves, particularly in the South. They increasingly
identified as Republicans and voted for Republican candidates, thereby
reinvigorating what had been a moribund GOP in the South. Real partisan
competition in the South emerged between the Democratic Party, newly
remade with African American voters as one of its core constituencies, and the
Republican Party, built on the base of erstwhile Democrats and other white
conservatives. Partisan competition motivated both parties, though primarily
the Democratic Party, to court African American voters aggressively in ways
that appear to many commentators as the "normal, pluralist interest group
politics to which the VRA aspired. "' 8 If the VRA provided a command-and-
control method for ensuring representation of African American interests, a
newly competitive partisan environment now seemed to empower African
American voters as had not been seen in a century.2 9
In light of the changed politics of the South, however, critics argue that the
VRA now may threaten to compromise, rather than promote, this electoral
competition between the major parties."0 Section 2 of the VRA carves out, at
least when conditions of racially polarized voting prevail, majority-minority
jurisdictions that assure the election of the minority group's candidates of
choice as its representatives."1 The close association between African American
z6. MARSHALLFRADY, WALLACE 289 (1996).
27. See EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STLMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 74 (1989); FRYMER, supra note 22, at 26. See
generally Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Ideological Realignment in the U.S.
Electorate, 60 J. POL. 634 (1998); Persily, Promise and Pitfalls, supra note 21.
28. Pildes, supra note 6, at 97.
29. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 35, 47-49 (2003) (describing the political leverage of minority
groups); Pildes, supra note 6, at 95-99 (arguing that the VRA embodies a command-and-
control regime outdated in the face of two-party competition nationwide).
30. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 6Ol-03 (1993) (defining "filler
people"); John Hart Ely, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARv. L.
REV. 576, 584-85 (1997) (discussing the problem of "filler people"); Lani Guinier, Groups,
Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REV.
1589, 1614-16 (1993) (discussing the problem of "wasted votes").
31. See generally Gerken, supra note 18.
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voters and Democrats means that representational guarantees for African
Americans under the VRA inevitably produce safe districts for Democrats that
are almost completely insulated from partisan competition.32 Electoral
competition here cuts against representation, and the converse is true as well.33
A district that is electorally competitive between Republicans and Democrats,
for instance, is likely to produce close elections that encourage the parties to
compete aggressively, but is also likely to saddle a significant portion of the
district's electorate, including the racial minority, with a representative whom
it does not want. 4 Conversely, a majority-minority district designed to ensure
that a racial minority voter will be represented by the candidate of her choice is
likely, as a direct consequence, to be "safe" and not electorally competitive.
3
1
Many commentators therefore question whether the VRA is politically
necessary to ensure consideration of minority interests that might already be
addressed through energetic partisan competition. 36 Indeed, VRA critics
suggest that VRA representational guarantees in the form of majority-minority
districts may not only be unnecessary, but may actively preempt healthy
engagement and bargaining between the racial minority and the rest of the
political system. Samuel Issacharoff questions whether the VRA's "narrow
focus on securing the electability of minority candidates could compromise the
range of political accords available to minority voters. '3 7 Likeminded critics
have joined Issacharoff's skepticism about majority-minority districts under
the VRA and now increasingly believe that "[r]ather than impos[ing] a
particular view about what kind of representation is 'fair' on blacks or Latinos,
32. See McDonald, supra note io, at 232-33.
33. See Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARv. L. REv. 649, 667-73 (2002).
34. See id. at 679 (arguing that competitive districts "leave almost half the political consumers
with a bitter taste in their mouths for two or more years"); see also Thomas L. Brunell,
Rethinking Redistricting: How Drawing Uncompetitive Districts Eliminates Gerrymanders,
Enhances Representation, and Improves Attitudes Toward Congress, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 77
(2006) (arguing that minimizing competitive districts promotes voter satisfaction).
3S. The degree to which a majority-minority district can be considered electorally safe varies
somewhat. It was once the case that the racial minority group within a majority-minority
district needed to constitute at least sixty-five percent of the district's total population for
the district to be considered "safe" as a minority guarantee under the VRA. See United
Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (establishing the sixty-
five percent rule). More recently, courts have been willing to recognize districts as safe with
bare popular majorities for the racial minority. I refer to majority-minority districts
generally as "safe," even though a few individual majority-minority districts may not be
electorally safe in a given election.
36. See supra note 6.
37. Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 1729.
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we can simply let members of those groups do what any other political
minority does in a healthy democracy: negotiate the best deal possible.
' 3s
B. LULAC v. Perry
New skepticism about safe districting under the VRA came to a head in
LULAC v. Perry,39 the Supreme Court's most recent VRA decision. LULAC
addressed the infamous Texas congressional "re-redistricting" in which state
Republicans broke from custom and engaged in a middecade redistricting,
undoing the court-approved apportionment already in place. 4° Although public
attention focused on the partisan gerrymandering claims entertained by the
Court, the Court also reviewed VRA-related claims with respect to three
congressional districts, namely Districts 23, 24, and 25 under the LULAC
redistricting.4' The Court's resolution of the VRA issues in the case emerged as
the most interesting, provocative, and controversial element of LULAC.
Most notably, the Court's solicitude toward the VRA claims of Latinos
residing in District 23 stands in sharp juxtaposition to the Court's dismissal of
claims by African Americans residing in District 24. Before the L ULAC
redistricting, old District 23 was a majority-minority district, with Latinos
constituting 57.5% of the voting-age population, but Latinos were not able to
control the district electorally and select their candidate of choice.42 Since 1996,
District 23 had been represented by Republican Congressman Henry Bonilla
who, while a Latino himself, was not supported by the Latino community and
garnered just eight percent of Latino votes in the 2002 election immediately
preceding the L ULAC redistricting.
43
What stood out for the Court, however, was that the Latino community of
old District 23, by 2003, may have been on the verge of ousting incumbent
Bonilla from office. Latino voters "were poised to elect their candidate of
choice" and "were becoming more politically active, with a marked and
continuous rise in Spanish-surnamed voter registration."' The LULAC
38. Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach,
1o6 COLUM. L. REv. 708, 714 (2006).
39. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
40. See generally Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 443, 465-68 (2005) (describing the Texas re-redistricting in 2003).
41. See 126 S. Ct. at 2612-26.
42. See id. at 2613.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2621.
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redistricting, by dismantling old District 23 and splitting up Latino voting
strength, "not only made fruitless the Latinos' mobilization efforts but also
acted against those Latinos who were becoming most politically active."4 The
Court objected to the effort to thwart the growing efficacy of Latino voters and
insulate an incumbent from dissatisfied constituents. The Court held that the
dismantling of old District 23 violated section 2 of the VRA. 
6
By contrast, the Court was openly dismissive of the VRA claims brought by
African Americans in old District 24, surrounding Dallas-Fort Worth. In truth,
the legal foundation for their claims was shaky at best. The African American
community in District 24 comprised only a quarter of the total population,
47
qualifying not as a majority-minority district, but instead only as a coalition
district, in which the minority population does not by itself control the
selection of the district's representatives. 48  Nonetheless, the plaintiffs
contended, and the state did not dispute, that the African American community
had managed consistently to elect its candidate of choice in District 24 ."
African Americans constituted a voting majority within the Democratic Party
such that they successfully supported Congressman Martin Frost in the
Democratic primary and then voted for him as part of a cross-racial Democratic
coalition in the general election. The effect of the LULAC redistricting of the
African American community was to dismantle District 24, but the protection
of such coalition districts had never been clearly established under the VRA by
lower courts.
The Court, however, rested its rejection of these VRA claims on somewhat
surprising alternate grounds. The Court affirmed the dismissal based on a
finding that Frost never qualified in the first place as the minority community's
candidate of choice."0 Despite the consistent support for Frost among African
Americans, the Court doubted whether Frost, a white centrist, could be
considered as their genuine candidate of choice given the lack of electoral
competition in District 24. The Court explained that the "fact that African
4S. Id. at 2622.
46. Id. at 2623.
47. Id. at 2624.
48. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 492 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing
majority-minority districts "in which minorities can elect their candidates of choice by their
own voting power, to coalition districts, in which minorities are in fact shown to have a
similar opportunity when joined by predictably supportive nonminority voters"); Richard
H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itsel?. Social Science and Voting Rights in the
2ooos, 8o N.C. L. REv. 1517, 1529-39 (2002) (explaining the politics of"coalitional districts").
49. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2624.
so. Id. at 2625.
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Americans preferred Frost to some others" was not determinative, because
Frost simply never faced serious opposition that presented African American
voters with real alternatives."1 The Court speculated that a challenge from a
credible African American candidate, perhaps in the primary, might have
attracted African American votes away from Frost. The Court also speculated
that "Anglos and Latinos would vote in the Democratic primary in greater
numbers if an African American candidate of choice were to run." 2 In other
words, the absence of electoral competition undercut the meaningfulness of
African American support for Frost in an uncontested district that habitually
reelected the Democratic incumbent.
The Court's disparate treatment of Districts 23 and 24 is puzzling, because
it was the latter, not the former, in which the minority group was actually
represented by the candidate it supported. On one hand, the Court found a
VRA violation in the dismantling of old District 23, where Latinos were not
represented by their candidate of choice. Latinos were instead represented by a
Republican, Henry Bonilla, whom they opposed and strove to defeat. On the
other hand, the Court did not find a VRA violation in the dismantling of
District 24, where the effect was to deprive African American voters of Martin
Frost, a representative whom they had supported for two decades.
The disparate results of LULAC make more sense, however, if the Court
was focused less on representation than on electoral competition. Ellen Katz
argues that the Court was not concerned that Latinos had not been represented
by their candidate of choice in old District 23, but instead was outraged by the
thwarting of the developing electoral competition between Republicans and
Democrats in the district." The Court admired the electoral competitiveness of
District 23 before the redistricting and what it saw as the corresponding
political vibrancy and engagement in the Latino community. Katz contends
that the Court believed that "[t]he prospect of defeating Bonilla mobilized
Laredo's Latino voters, while the redistricting plan eliminated that prospect
and the political engagement it engendered." 4 The Court repeatedly
characterized the Latino community before the redistricting as "politically
51. Id. The factual record established that Frost's district had been safely Democratic; insulated
from challenges; crafted for Frost himself; and at least according to one witness, drawn
specifically to elect a white Democrat. See id.
52. Id. at 2624.
53. See Katz, supra note 16, at 1171-73.
s4. Id. at 1177.
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active" and averred that the LULAC redistricting, by breaking it up,
"undermined the progress of a racial group."
s"
Conversely, the noncompetitiveness of Martin Frost's District 24 undercut
the value of its preservation, at least to the Court's eyes. If the prospect of
victory stimulated vibrancy in the competitive old District 23 in a way that
called for VRA protection, the Court appeared repulsed by the electoral security
of old District 24. The Court seemed to believe that a "noncompetitive district
[like District 24] becomes a forum unlikely to generate the engagement and
vibrancy Justice Kennedy thought had been manifest in Laredo. '', 6 The
guarantee of Frost's incumbency, in the Court's view, stripped away the value
of preserving old District 24, even if it meant that the African American
community would lose the congressman they consistently supported.17 As a
result, LULAC represents a decided normative choice in favor of the ideals of
electoral competition, as embodied in the Court's mind by old District 23, over
the representational guarantee offered by old District 24.
What is more, the Court's treatment of new District 25 only reinforces the
Court's prioritization of electoral competition. New District 25 was an offset
majority-minority district, stretching geographically from Austin to the
Mexican border, designed to compensate for the dismantling of old District 23
in the LULAC redistricting. In fact, the district court below found that the new
District 25 is "a more effective Latino opportunity district than Congressional
District 23 had been." 8 Nonetheless, the Court in LULAC held that new
District 25 could not serve as an adequate offset for the dismantling of the
cherished old District 23. In contrast to the Court's celebration of political
cohesiveness among Latinos in District 23, the Court disdained new District 25
as "an entirely new district that combined two groups of Latinos, hundreds of
miles apart, that represent different communities of interest. '" 9
The Court never fully analyzed the VRA merits of new District 25, but the
Court did conclude that new District 25 failed to satisfy the requirement of
political compactness under section 2 of the VRA, in a ruling that Daniel Ortiz
55. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2621.
56. Katz, supra note 16, at 118o.
s. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redistricting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185 (2007)
(arguing that the Court doubted the authenticity of Frost's representation in the absence of
genuine electoral competition).
58. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 503 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
59. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2623.
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dubs a requirement of "cultural compactness. Part III extensively discusses
this cultural compactness requirement introduced in LULAC, but it suffices to
say for now that the Court rejected the replacement of old District 23 with new
District 25 and expressly privileged the "growing Latino political power",6' in an
electorally competitive District 23. The Court again preferred the competitive
District 23, even absent representation by the candidate of choice, over the
surer guarantee of representation in another district, this time the electorally
secure District 25.
The Court's linkage of the VRA claims and electoral competition is deeply
intriguing and goes to the heart of VRA jurisprudence. The implication is that
the VRA honors minority voters' revealed preferences only when sufficient
electoral competition exists to certify their genuineness. Old District 24, an
incumbent-friendly haven, stood in contrast to the competitiveness of old
District 23, where Latinos appeared on the verge of overthrowing the
incumbent. Under this interpretation, Ellen Katz argues that "minority voters
might have a protected right to participate in a competitive political
environment but not in a noncompetitive one. ' ' 62 The modern-day VRA, and
the tensions it poses, expose deeper assumptions about how the Court believes
democratic politics operate, how they should operate, and the perceived
centrality of electoral competition in the Court's reasoning.6"
Despite the central value placed on electoral competition by both the Court
and commentators, there is need to reexamine the precise function of electoral
competition in democratic theory, even as the Court begins to incorporate
electoral competition more tightly into the law of the VRA. The close focus on
electoral competition by both the Court and commentators has been deeply
undertheorized and neglectful of other salient democratic values. 64 Electoral
60. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 1O5 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 48, 50
(2oo6), http ://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/volio5/ortiz.pdf.
61. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2623.
62. Katz, supra note 16, at 1164.
63. See id. at 1166 (arguing that LULAC "rests on a nascent conception of political harm
experienced by all voters - regardless of race - when a political system is rigged to block
competition").
64. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the
Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 8o N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1142 (2002) (listing "majority
rule, political participation, accountability, responsiveness, substantial equality, and interest
representation" in a nonexhaustive list). In fact, Pildes admits that his prioritization of
electoral competition purposely sets aside other important values for the sake of parsimony
and judicial focus. See Pildes, supra note 8, at 690 (claiming the need to "reduce the welter
of values behind democracy to a structure that will helpfilly orient judicial oversight of
politics around one set of questions"). As I argue above, however, the question is whether
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competition is too narrow, failing to connect with normative commitments
such as participation and deliberation. A focus on electoral competition may
crowd out and affirmatively cut against fulfillment of these other important
normative goals whose subordination may be questionable in particular or
general instances. If other democratic values deserve service at all, then
advocates of electoral competition must justify the tradeoffs against those
values required by the promotion of electoral competition. There may be times
when the goals of participation or deliberation should trump the promotion of
electoral competition.
In fact, electoral competition itself depends on other important democratic
interests, such as political participation and deliberation, to be meaningful. For
example, if electoral competition is to safeguard responsiveness, as its
proponents hope, electoral competition depends critically on at least a
minimally informed and engaged citizenry capable of evaluating the basic
contest for leadership. Although Richard Pildes argues that electoral
competition is the "one structural aim that the history of American law and
democracy suggests should be a particular focal point,"6, it is difficult to
imagine electoral competition succeeding unless the public participates,
engages, and deliberates sufficiently to choose among the alternatives
competing for votes. 6 6 Any theory of electoral competition must presume that
individual citizens develop sensibilities about their interests, group
identifications, and preferences over government policy. Although
competition-oriented theorists may claim that democracy should be defined
almost exclusively as a "competitive struggle for the people's vote and not
discussion and decision among the people themselves," 6, such a tight focus on
electoral competition leaves much missing from its normative account of
healthy democracy- namely, how people arrive at their political preferences
that drive electoral competition in the first place and make electoral
responsiveness meaningful.
Electoral competition instead is best understood as an instrumental means
to deeper first-order ends. To assess whether electoral competition serves as an
effective, perhaps even superior, substitute for majority-minority districts
the costs of parsimony outweigh its benefits such that a competition-oriented approach fails
to appreciate the interconnectedness of other democratic values with the instrumental goals
of electoral competition.
65. Pildes, supra note 13, at 1607.
66. See Pildes, supra note 8, at 691-95 (acknowledging that "how politicians give information to
voters and how voters inform one another ... is critical to well-functioning competitive
politics").
67. ALBERT WEALE, DEMOCRACY 98 (1999).
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under the VRA, it is necessary to specify as a normative matter the ultimate
outcomes sought. Pildes questions the continuing usefulness of safe majority-
minority districting, consistent on these grounds with the Court's reasoning in
LULAC,68 because he believes that electoral competition may achieve the goal
of representational equality for African Americans more effectively." 9 I argue
instead that the normative aspiration for electoral competition or the VRA
should not be simply to achieve representational equality for a designated racial
community as a group. Electoral competition and the VRA, and perhaps the
law of democracy as a general matter, should aspire to promote a vibrant
process by which all citizens, irrespective of race, are consistently challenged by
political choices about their political identity and sensibilities, which need not
track racial lines.
The next Part introduces that deeper process of participation and political
discourse as the process of "democratic contestation." Political leaders contest
one another rhetorically and otherwise within the sociopolitical discourse to
shape the political choices of the mass public. Electoral competition is generally
desirable as an important catalyst for this process of democratic contestation
and consonant with the goals of a theory of democratic contestation. Electoral
competition helps generate democratic contestation and typically coincides
with it, stirring up competitive debate. But the two overlapping notions of
competition in politics -electoral competition on one hand and democratic
contestation on the other hand-diverge in important ways. Electoral
competition should be recognized as a second-order means of generating first-
order democratic contestation that may need to give way when an emphasis on
electoral competition actually inhibits democratic contestation, at least under
exceptional circumstances.
In these important exceptions, a process of democratic contestation may
best be promoted by an effective reduction in electoral competition in ways
that have not been considered. By digging past the second-order mechanism of
electoral competition to uncover its normative roots, a theory of democratic
contestation identifies the core values underlying electoral competition and
finds opportunities to foster those values in other ways that may, surprisingly,




68. Pildes departs from the LULAC decision, however, with respect to other concerns. See, e.g.,
Pildes, supra note 14, at 1153-55 (objecting to the Court's concerns about essentialization).
69. Pildes, supra note 6, at 97-98.
70. See infra Part 111.
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II. DEMOCRATIC CONTESTATION
This Part introduces a theory of democratic contestation. It explains that
healthy democratic politics flow from the basic process of democratic
contestation -the fundamental political competition among leaders to
influence the public's basic choices about politics and the ultimate political
alignment of the polity. Through a process of democratic contestation, political
leaders compete to shape, coordinate, and frame the public's understandings
about electoral politics, public policy, and civic affairs. I develop a theory of
democratic contestation that places central normative focus on the
encouragement of a competitive, dynamic process of democratic contestation. A
theory of democratic contestation presses beyond electoral competition and
articulates a more specific account of how democratic politics operate and
ultimately connect with normative ends.
A. A Theory of Democratic Contestation
The process of democratic contestation is the ongoing sociopolitical
discourse among political leaders to influence how the mass public
understands public affairs and develops its political associations and self-
identifications. Through the process of democratic contestation,7' rival leaders
aggressively attempt to influence sociopolitical thought and culture, both
within and without the electoral context, and direct public sensibilities about
what societal cleavages are politically relevant and what concerns are worth
contesting in politics. As leaders argue in favor of policy, ideological, and
symbolic positions, they offer to the public a full set of choices, to be
effectuated through elections and democratic politics, about what they care
about, what they are willing to dedicate government toward, and what lines
they are willing to draw across society in fighting for them. "American
democracy in all its complexity," as Robert Bennett explains, "can be
understood as an engine for producing a diverse menu of conversation about
71. Democratic contestation should not be confused with Philip Pettit's "contestatory
democratization." Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in
DEMOCRACY'S VALUE 163, 178-88 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cord6n eds., 1999).
Rather than referring to a political process of public deliberation, Pettit introduces
contestatory democratization as an institutional regime under which government decisions
may be challenged by individuals as inconsistent with a shared, nondiscriminating system of
democratic government. Id. at 179-8o.
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public affairs, largely carried on in public."7" The process of democratic
contestation enables just such a public conversation.
A theory of democratic contestation identifies as its central goal the
promotion of a robust process of democratic contestation. It emphasizes the
function and incentives of leaders who challenge the public with important
choices and thus drive participatory politics from the top down through a
process of democratic contestation. Under a theory of democratic contestation,
political divisions and alignment do not emerge automatically or inevitably
from the individual preferences of the mass public. There are many potential
majorities that may become politically relevant,7 3 and the process of democratic
contestation mediates which majority becomes politically dominant and which
issues or political divisions define the political agenda.74 Should we associate
politically along socioeconomic class divisions, or instead along cultural
disagreements? What role should religion and race play, if any? Should the
next election be decided strictly along party lines, or is it an audit of the
incumbent's performance? Will this election be a referendum on the hot issue
of today, or should a new issue take its place?
Every new way of framing and constructing the political landscape, each
new issue or alternative, activates a different majority of citizens and may shift
the balance of power from one side to another. A loser along one dimension
can reframe the debate, switch issues, and alter the political agenda to escape a
losing position and activate a new, winning majority alignment.7" Politics, on
this view, can be conceptualized as how a political society decides to divide up.
Political divisions may be relatively thin, grouping people according to their
views regarding a single issue, or they may be thick, like partisanship,
aggregating disagreement along multiple issues at once. All divisions, though,
are undergirded by understandings about politics. At a deeper level, the process
72. ROBERT W. BENNETT, TALKING IT THROUGH: PUZzLES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34 (2OO3).
73. See WILIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 131 (Randall L. Calvert, John Mueller & Rick K. Wilson eds., 1996) ("The
practical consequence of the existence of a cycle of tastes is that there are many potential
majorities."); see also Kenneth A. Shepsle, Losers in Politics (and How They Sometimes Become
Winners): William Riker's Heresthetic, I PERSP. ON POL. 307 (2003) (discussing Riker's theory
that losers may propel fresh or reframed issues into the political debate).
74. See E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 66 (196o) (noting that "each new cleavage produces a new allocation of
power").
75. A loser seeks, not necessarily to change the position of individual voters on a particular
issue, but instead to change individual voters' minds about what particular issue they should
focus on. See id. at 68 (arguing that "the definition of the alternatives is the supreme
instrument of power" (emphasis omitted)).
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of democratic contestation, and politics itself, is a rhetorical competition
among various leaders of all stripes- fighting to define those public
understandings about politics (and thus the prevailing political alignment) in
ways that promote their causes. 6 Electoral competition is valuable, not because
it presents choices between candidates, but mainly because it motivates this
larger, rich process of democratic contestation.
Through the process of democratic contestation, political leaders simplify
and organize politics for public understanding in ways that help the mass
public overcome the usual collective action problems that beset mass
coordination. Individual citizens are consumers of political organization, not its
originators, basically responding to the competing appeals of political leaders
and choosing how to align. As explained further below,7 without external
leadership individual citizens may struggle to learn about politics, identify their
self-interests, and find like-minded others in a diffuse, disconnected society.
Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres's evocative thought experiment, in which a
crowded amphitheater full of people attempts to self-govern,78 helps illustrate a
central dilemma of collective action. Only so much can be accomplished
through individual interactions with nearby peers. A diffuse, disconnected
public will struggle to communicate within itself and set a clear agenda, to
decide even what to decide, much less determine a collective position on
particular issues. 79 Among an amphitheater of people, in the absence of
external coordination and agenda setting, how would any individual know
what others in the crowd are thinking or how they plan to act? How would she
communicate with enough of her like-minded peers to determine relevant lines
76. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State:
Keep the Bathwater, But Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 309, 337-40 (2002)
(describing political discourse as a process through which people create and respond to
competing political meanings).
7. See infra Section III.B.
78. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING
POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 183-88 (2002). To illustrate their views about
territorial districting, Guinier and Torres describe a thought experiment in which citizens of
"Old Verona" sit inside a large amphitheater watching a rabbi and bishop argue on stage
below. Citizens sit too far away to hear the argument and are instead entitled to elect a
group representative from their respective seating section who would observe the argument
on their behalf, report back his findings, and lead a subsequent group discussion of the
topics at issue on stage. Guinier and Torres hope that the thought experiment helps
illustrate that territorial proximity is an arbitrary way to determine representation and
conclude that allowing citizens to wander the amphitheater in search of their desired group
discussion would be preferable. Id. at 187.
79. See generally AvINASH K. DIXrT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY (1991);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980).
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of agreement and disagreement on which even to begin? Disconnected citizens
struggle without external coordination, but when political leaders offer them a
few simple choices, mass commonality emerges as roughly like-minded
individuals answer with similar responses. Politics are driven less by the
bottom-up interests of individual citizens than by the strategic, top-down
agenda setting by leaders, constrained by competitive demands, to coordinate
and channel individual citizens into their preferred directions.8o
Democratic theory valuing political participation and democratic
deliberation has tended to prize bottom-up orientations toward mass politics.
As the next Section explains in greater detail, the hope of bottom-up
coordination and sophisticated deliberation by average citizens, unequipped for
either, has always been unrealistic,8 ' leaving such approaches to democratic
theory vulnerable to criticism by advocates of electoral competition.s2 A theory
of democratic contestation disclaims the highest aspirations that average
citizens typically should serve as "first-order deliberators on policy issues ' or
that "every member of the community . . . takes part, actively and
responsibly.84 A theory of democratic contestation instead fully recognizes the
centrality of top-down leadership in the political process. Nor does a theory of
democratic contestation insist on a political process that trades exclusively in
neutral, public-regarding justification, in place of sociopolitical self-interest or
exercise of leadership power.5 The promotion of civic virtue is not the primary
aim. Although a robust process of democratic contestation would incentivize
leaders to generate public-regarding appeals that attract broader support, a
go. See KEY, supra note 22, at 245-95 (emphasizing the centrality of political leadership and
organization); SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 74, at 35-6o (describing politics as
organization and counterorganization of the public by competing leaders); id. at 138 ("The
emphasis is on the role of leadership and organization in a democracy, not on the
spontaneous generation of something at the grass roots.").
Si. See infra Section III.B.
82. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 158-64 (castigating participatory and deliberative
approaches as unrealistic, elitist, and invariably disappointed by real politics); JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SocIAusM, AND DEMOCRACY 25O-68 (3d ed. 1950) (criticizing the
classical doctrine of democracy as hopelessly unrealistic).
83. Pildes, supra note 8, at 693 (using the term to criticize theories of deliberative democracy).
84. SCHUMPETER, supra note 82, at 250.
8s. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 101 (1996) ("In
a deliberative democracy, then, the principle of publicity requires that government adopt
only those policies for which officials and citizens give public justifications."); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 241-54 (expanded ed. 2005) (requiring "public reason" to be the
centerpiece of the political process); Henry S. Richardson, Democratic Intentions, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 349, 376 (James Bohman &
William Rehg eds., 1997) (requiring commitment to the public good).
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theory of democratic contestation does not exclude or otherwise discredit the
normal operation of leadership bargaining and majoritarian politics. A theory
of democratic contestation realistically acknowledges the basic necessity of
leadership competition as the catalyst for mass politics and the limits of
bottom-up mobilization, but it does so without also abandoning all
appreciation of participatory and deliberative values.86
Indeed, a theory of democratic contestation celebrates and finds significant
value in the individual engagement of citizens with politics enabled by the
process of democratic contestation.87 Personal engagement by individual
citizens with this process of democratic contestation confers to those
individuals significant constitutive value that transcends the simple
instrumental worth of voting and participation. Active political participation,
as described by Hannah Arendt, Frank Michelman, and others, contributes
directly to personal self-realization.88 Individual participation helps citizens
forge their political identity and develop a personal sense of social and moral
agency through engagement with politics. Moreover, direct engagement with
political discourse over the public good fosters a sense of public virtue and
public spiritedness, as well as bonding the individual citizen with the collective
welfare of the political community. 89 A robust process of democratic
contestation encourages participation and spreads these benefits of political
engagement throughout the mass public.
A theory of democratic contestation avoids the mistake of ignoring the
value of political engagement when it falls short of the lofty ideal of much
democratic theory. Citizens derive constitutive value by considering the
admittedly simplified choices regarding the common good offered by the
86. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 8, at 144 (arguing that theorists of competitive democracy, like
himself, "don't believe politics has intrinsic value or that political activity is ennobling").
87. This emphasis on individual participation and engagement distinguishes a theory of
democratic contestation from deliberative democracy and civic republicanism, which tend to
value elite deliberation as an end in itself rather than as a catalyst for grassroots participation
and engagement. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711,
747-55 (2001) (contrasting a deliberative democratic or civic republican emphasis on the
quality of deliberation and a participatory emphasis on citizen involvement).
88. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE (Penguin Books 1968) (1954);
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE
(1984); JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (George
Routledge & Aons, Ltd. 1928) (1861); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in
American ConstitutionalArgument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443 (1989).
89. See generally MILL, supra note 88; CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC
THEORY 22-34 (1970); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 336-63 (2000); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
(Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1987) (1762).
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deliberative process of democratic contestation. Even a limited form of political
engagement, in response to democratic contestation, promotes the
development of individual sensibilities about the public good and
government's proper role in achieving it. Political engagement enables citizens
to weigh for themselves where they stand on an array of policy, ideological,
and symbolic questions, framed by leaders, and in so doing, cultivate their
political self-identity- for instance, as a conservative, Democrat,
environmentalist, or patriot, among many overlapping possibilities. This
process of engagement may attract citizens into deeper political interest and
participation, within and without the electoral context, and foster political
efficacy, legitimacy, and investment in the healthy operation of American
democracy. Familiar forms of engagement, framed and simplified by political
leadership, should be valued for what they provide, not regretted for what they
are not. A theory of democratic contestation finds nothing inconsistent
between this appreciation of the individual self-constitutive value of political
participation on one hand and a leader-centered view of how mass politics
operate through a process of democratic contestation on the other hand.
Instead, a theory of democratic contestation holds that the process of
democratic contestation is itself a necessary element of participatory and
deliberative politics as they actually operate. The process of democratic
contestation permits individuals, themselves only intermittently interested in
public affairs and otherwise occupied by everyday life, to participate
meaningfully in just such self-constitutive ways. The competitive pressures of
democratic contestation require leaders to reach out to the mass public at an
accessible level such that individuals themselves need not engage directly in
sophisticated political deliberation for meaningful political engagement.9" The
process of democratic contestation generates a political discourse in which
average citizens are presented with manageable choices about the direction,
tenor, and substance of politics, simplifying and ordering politics for
individuals who otherwise would remain rationally ignorant and hopelessly
disconnected. As the process of democratic contestation unfolds, it invites the
public into political engagement and deliberation on terms that it appreciates
and invites citizens constantly to rethink their personal commitments and
understandings."' Public deliberation occurs usefully, boiled down to a limited
go. See Dennis F. Thompson, The Role of Theorists and Citizens in Just Elections: A Response to
Professors Cain, Garrett, and Sabi, 4 ELECTION L.J. 153, 157 (2005) (disclaiming hopes that "all
citizens [will] 'fly to the assembly' to talk all day" and urging "modest aims" in democratic
deliberation).
91. See ROGER W. COBB & CHARLEs D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE
DYNAMIcS OF AGENDA-BUILDING 43-62, 101-24 (1972) (describing a dynamic process in
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set of core issues, with a limited set of alternatives emerging from leadership
competition, for the public to weigh.92 It is, basically, the method by which
American mass democracy operates. 93 A theory of democratic contestation
offers a realistic model of participatory politics that admits the obvious
limitations inherent in mass politics, but nonetheless embraces the real
opportunities for political engagement and deliberation available in spite of
them.94
Democratic contestation thus connects the constitutive value of individual
self-development at the micro level to the aggregative value of electoral
competition at the macro level. 95 Through the process of democratic
contestation, people decide who they are as political creatures, align under
political leadership, and constitute the collective political landscape in response
to leadership. Out of that process of individual empowerment, individual
which parties expand the scope of sociopolitical conflict and draw in the larger public);
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 74, at 3-17 (describing politics as a contest over the
socialization of conflict in which losers attempt to call in outside help by expanding
conflict).
92. See, e.g., R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ & JOHN BREHM, HARD CHOICES, EASY ANSWERS: VALUES,
INFORMATION, AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 216-24 (2002) (describing how people reason
sensibly about difficult political questions by drawing upon basic value predispositions);
BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN
AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 383-98 (1992) (concluding that people deliberate
rationally at a general level and respond sensibly to information on broad questions of
public affairs); SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION IN PRESIDENTML CAMPAIGN (2d ed. 1994) (describing the accurate use of basic
information by people to reach sensible conclusions about politicians and policy
preferences); JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: How PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES
AMERICAN POLITICS 31-57 (2004) (describing the responsiveness of the mass public and how
the public modulates its preferences to current political events); Edward G. Carmines &
James A. Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 78 (198o)
(distinguishing public reasoning on "easy" and "hard" issues).
93. As E.E. Schattschneider explained succinctly, the people are a sovereign that "can speak only
when spoken to," and "whose vocabulary is limited to two words, 'Yes' and 'No."' E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 52 (1942); see also V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES,
AND PRESSURE GROUPS 247 (1942) ("[A] mass of people cannot act as a unit; a small inner
circle has to narrow the choices for public office and to formulate questions of public
policy.").
94. See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 74, at 135 ("Democracy was made for the people, not the
people for democracy."); Kang, supra note 17, at 1163 (arguing that models of participatory
democracy should "accept how people think about politics, rather than denying and hoping
to change how people think about politics").
95. See POSNER, supra note 8, at 130-57 (contrasting Concept I and Concept II theorists along
similar lines); SCHUMPETER, supra note 82, at 250-83 (contrasting what he calls the classical
doctrine of democracy with his theory of competitive leadership); Gerken, supra note 38, at
748-51 (contrasting participatory and elite-centered views of democracy).
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choices - in aggregate - form collective understandings about politics, which in
turn form the distribution of political preferences across society. Democratic
contestation makes possible the political self-constitution of individuals, and in
the process makes possible the political self-constitution of the sociopolitical
community as a whole. By connecting the mass public with leadership politics
in this way, the process of democratic contestation helps construct the
backdrop of political understandings against which elections and electoral
competition take place. Democratic contestation, therefore, invests elections
with their substantive meaning and legitimacy. The process of democratic
contestation, of which elections and campaigns are only one part, gives rise to a
mass political discourse that enables individuals to identify their sociopolitical
interests, develop a political self-identity, and then hold leaders accountable to
their sociopolitical interests through elections.
An odd feature of criticism against participatory approaches to democracy
is an assumption that modern political rhetoric is "largely content-free" 6 and
citizens know their ideological interests almost detached from the context of
contemporary political discourse.9 7 Under this view, political interests and
preferences come first. Political deliberation is nearly unnecessary, because
voters, as consumers, instinctively know what they want to buy. However,
political tastes are not defined exogenously. Public engagement with the
process of democratic contestation is necessary for citizens' determinations of
their political interests, which in turn underpin the meaningfulness of electoral
competition. To know how to associate ideologically, citizens must engage and
understand the alternatives in the political world and the ever-evolving
political meaning attached to them. Even though the level of sophistication
falls short of the academic ideal, there is always an ongoing, familiar political
discourse, both within and outside the context of campaigns and elections, by
which citizens daily receive political information, are effectively presented with
ideological choices, and respond with determinations about who they are
politically and how they feel about politics. Electoral competition is valuable
not simply because it helps ensure government responsiveness to these
determinations, but more importantly because it generally stirs up the process
of democratic contestation that generates these determinations in the first
place.
A theory of democratic contestation brings fresh perspective and conceptual
clarity needed to advance familiar debates. For instance, commentators have
g6. POSNER, supra note 8, at 153.
97. See, e.g., id. at 168-69 ("People have a pretty good idea of their own interests, or at least a
better idea than officials do.").
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debated the relative attractiveness of different forms of electoral competition
and the tradeoffs among them.9s However, these debates almost uniformly
have failed to dig deeper to the common currency underlying the democratic
value of all forms of electoral competition. This failure undermines attempts to
compare and contrast different forms of electoral competition because of the
resulting inability to measure electoral competition by its ultimate standards
for success. Perhaps it is preferable to have more interparty competition in
general elections rather than more intraparty competition in primary elections,
to the degree that there is a tradeoff. But a close focus on electoral competition
as an end in itself falters because it does not capture the more deeply rooted
common value in all forms of political competition. Only once the process of
democratic contestation is identified as the baseline value underlying political
competition does it become possible to compare different forms of electoral
competition with respect to this common currency, and only then can we
successfully compare the relative merits, for instance, of competitive primary
and general elections.
A theory of democratic contestation contemplates political competition on a
more fundamental level than electoral competition among candidates for office.
Electoral competition, in this sense, is but a single form of political competition,
which democratic contestation encourages in many manifestations. Focused on
the goal of generating a lively public discourse, a theory of democratic
contestation admits and encourages political competition at multiple levels in
dynamic combination. The process of democratic contestation, for instance,
may be served not only by intradistrict competition between partisan
candidates at election time, but also legislative competition between the major
parties (and perhaps minor parties as well) during the rest of the year. 99 As a
result, in the context of apportionment, the process of democratic contestation
may be advanced by some degree of safe districts on both sides of the aisle, in
which the parties have security in office, in place of fierce electoral
98. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1o96 (2005)
(discussing the competitive interaction between direct and representative democracy);
Gerken, supra note 18 (discussing the relative merits of competition across and within
institutions); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 8 (arguing in favor of intradistrict partisan
competition); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
-IApv. L. REV. 2312 (2006) (arguing in favor of partisan competition as a substitute for
institutional rivalry between branches of government); Persily, supra note 33, at 661-62
(arguing in favor of competitive primary elections and interdistrict competition).
99. See, e.g., Chad Flanders, Deliberative Dilemmas: A Critique of Deliberation Day from the
Perspective of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 147, 164-65 (2007) (discussing potential tradeoffs
between deliberation at the legislative level and deliberation at the citizen level).
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competition.' Incumbent security helps guarantee that both parties have
secure bases in the legislature and insulates them from severe swings in
partisan balance in the legislature.'"' Incumbent security also encourages the
development of party leadership who, when relieved of reelection worries, may
foster stronger interparty legislative competition that provides an optimal
blend of electoral and legislative contestation in ways that a myopic focus on
electoral competition prohibits or obscures." 2
A theory of democratic contestation therefore extends beyond a narrow
focus on elections to a broader consideration of ongoing legislative and
pluralistic politics. The process of democratic contestation should occur
continually between elections, within and across parties, as the government
decides public policy and the public decides how to define itself and the
direction of the state. There is a vast political science literature detailing the
degree to which leadership and public opinion constantly interact in a process
of deliberation that occurs perhaps in the extended shadow of electoral
considerations, but often distant from them in ways that complicate a narrow
focus on electoral competition.0 3 Interest groups jostle for public influence;
legislatures, agencies, and other institutions deliberate over public policy; and
leaders of various stripes push for substantive legislation and government
ioo. See Kang, supra note 40, at 459-61 (describing the benefits of "defensive gerrymandering" to
protect incumbents).
lo. See Nathaniel Persily, Thad Kousser & Patrick Egan, The Complicated Impact of One Person,
One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 8o N.C. L. REv. 1299, 1314-17 (2002).
102. Cf Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REv. lO99, 1124-26 (2005)
(contrasting values of different forms of intra- and interinstitutional diversity). What is
more, even safe one-party districts that exhibit almost no interparty competition, like many
majority-minority districts protected under the VRA, may be home to deep ideological
democratic contestation as valuable as that seen in highly competitive two-party districts.
103. See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990)
(describing the interaction of coalition leaders, politicians, and the public in legislative
lawmaking); FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE
IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 37-38 (1998) (explaining
that "much of the important work in lobbying is in setting the agenda, in defining the
alternatives for decision makers, in gathering evidence, and in convincing others that certain
types of evidence are germane to the decision at hand"); R. SEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE
LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS (1994) (describing interest group activism in the
courts); Julie L. Andsager, How Interest Groups Attempt To Shape Public Opinion with
Competing News Frames, 77 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. S77 (2000) (discussing efforts by
interest groups to influence news coverage); Elisabeth R. Gerber & Justin H. Phillips,
Development Ballot Measures, Interest Group Endorsements, and the Political Geography of
Growth Preferences, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 625 (2003) (examining the role of interest groups in
development ballot initiatives); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L.
REv. 339, 351-63 (1988) (discussing interest group activism in the regulatory process).
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action across a wide variety of settings, from media outlets, to courts, to
administrative agencies, to direct democracy. Elections are a central institution
of democratic politics, providing critical incentives for leadership attentiveness
to public concerns and mass preferences," 4 but it would be a mistake to
concentrate too narrowly on the interparty competitiveness of periodic
elections as the sole gauge of democratic health. The process of democratic
contestation is punctuated by elections, but not defined completely by them."1
A theory of democratic contestation offers a new approach to the basic
problems of the law of democracy. I do not intend here to articulate a
comprehensive survey of the law of democracy, but instead to introduce the
primary value of democratic contestation as a core aspiration and to clarify
thought about race and the VRA. The normative ends underlying a theory of
democratic contestation are not necessarily to ensure group representation, but
instead to ensure a dynamic environment in which leaders vie to present
competing proposals about what politics should be about and how groups
should be organized. Interest groups themselves, their demands for
representation notwithstanding, are endogenous to the political process.
Politics is not simply about whether groups get represented and how much
representation they get, but about what group alignments emerge and become
politically relevant in the first place.
104. As Dennis Thompson puts it nicely, "[e]lections can occur without democracy, but
democracy cannot endure without elections." DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS:
CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002).
1o5. To this point, commentators argue that the law of free expression under the First
Amendment, even in nonelectoral contexts, should be motivated by normative
commitments to competitive discourse that are somewhat akin to democratic contestation.
Most obviously, the notion that the First Amendment protects and cultivates a "marketplace
of ideas" pervades First Amendment law and commentary. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail ... ."); THOMAS I.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-8 (1963); Stanley
Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3 ("Scholars and
jurists frequently have used the image of a 'marketplace of ideas' to explain and justify the
first amendment freedoms of speech and press."). The marketplace model has influenced
campaign finance law, but nothing like the theory of democratic contestation has been
applied to the VRA as here, or to other areas of election law, such as gerrymandering or
direct democracy, where it might be equally appropriate. It is worth noting, however, that
Heather Gerken suggests that Justice Kennedy may be linking the First Amendment to race
and redistricting along parallel lines, but the theory underlying this jurisprudence still
appears strikingly undeveloped. See Heather K. Gerken, justice Kennedy and the Domains of
Equal Protection, 121 HARv. L. REv. 104 (2007).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
B. Beyond Pluralism: The Challenges of Collective Action and the Origins of
Mass Politics
The basic view of mass politics underpinning a theory of democratic
contestation disputes the oversimplified assumptions of American pluralist
theory and makes better sense of how mass politics operate in practice. A
theory of democratic contestation does not assume a political world in which
the public divides easily into well-identified groups of interest. Instead, as this
Section details, it assumes that the challenges of collective action, in the
absence of external coordination, tend to frustrate political alignment and
deliberative politics. Individuals know little about politics, have little incentive
to learn, and face high costs of information even if they try to learn.1°6 Without
leadership, it will be difficult to identify the most promising grounds for
political agreement and then equally difficult to coordinate, in a vast,
disorganized political landscape, with fellow citizens who share one's views.
Even well-informed individuals with well-specified political preferences may
struggle to coordinate with many others. It requires a process of democratic
contestation to offer the necessary leadership and structure to the dynamic
chaos of mass politics.
The Court's general approach to the VRA, however, tracks the basic
assumptions of pluralist theory and inherits the fundamental pluralist
oversimplication that people identify and coordinate along politically salient
divisions much more easily than they actually do.' °7 While pluralist theory does
not simply assume a cohesive majority that agrees on all questions, it posits the
construction of democratic majorities on a case-by-case basis, for every
question, issue, and election. Robert Dahl depicts a polyarchic world in which
"minorities rule," as groups combine to constitute temporary majorities in a
fluid process of pluralist competition and negotiation.'l ' The proper
functioning of pluralist politics where "minorities rule" presumes that the
public will be able to divide and coordinate along familiar political divisions
into particular minorities. Although individuals can accomplish little by
106. See infra notes 122-124.
107. See, e.g., ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL
PRESSURES 208-64 (1949) (assuming that group interests naturally manifest themselves in
pressure-group representation); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 57 (1953) (explaining simply that the
"proliferation of associations is inescapable" as the need arises); see also MANCUR OLSON, JR.,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 48-51 (1965)
(criticizing pluralist theorists for failing to question why and how groups organize).
io8. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 133 (1956).
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themselves, they naturally band together with like-minded others and
aggregate into groups along salient axes of political difference.
As such, pluralist theory posits that the basic form of political competition
occurs among interest groups, with important interests in society vying against
one another in the political system for attention.0 9 Pluralist theory
presupposes a society divided into identifiable and politically salient groups,
each pressing its competing claims in the democratic system."' In the same
spirit, the VRA extends group-based guarantees of fair treatment in the
pluralist competition."' Section 2 of the VRA promises racial minorities the
equal opportunity to "elect representatives of their choice" and to "participate
in the political process."11 2 The Court soon reasoned that these guarantees
require not merely that the individual have the right to vote and that the vote
be equally weighted, but the fair treatment of the group to which the
individual belongs." 3 As a consequence, the VRA moved beyond the atomistic
act of voting and guaranteed a fair chance of winning a preferred outcome."
4
The Court took on the task, under the VRA, of defining group-based vote
iog. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS.
CONTROL (1982); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967); KEY, supra note 22; TRUMAN, supra note 107.
11o. See, e.g., MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND
THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 179 (1998) ("Individuals secure the
representation of their interests in public policy decisions by organizing pressure groups to
influence policy makers."); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1542 (1988) (describing the pluralist vision of politics as a "struggle among interest groups
for scarce social resources").
mii. See, e.g., Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights
Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1412-13 (1983); Samuel Issacharoff,
Groups and the Right To Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 884-86 (1995).
112. 42 U.S.C. S 1973 (2000).
113. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. lo9, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to groups: groups of
voters elect representatives, individual voters do not."); Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 883-84
("[A]ny sophisticated right to genuinely meaningful electoral participation must be
evaluated and measured as a group right, that of groups of voters seeking the outcomes
promised to them through the electoral system.").
114. See also Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 883 ("To be effective, a voter's ballot must stand a
meaningful chance of effective aggregation with those of like-minded voters to claim a just
share of electoral results."). See generally Gerken, supra note 18 (explaining and defining
group entitlements under the VRA).
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dilution and weighing competing claims of different groups as a referee of the
pluralist process."I
For this reason, courts and commentators have shoehorned the VRA into
the larger vision of American pluralism and a "remedial theory of fair
representation for all groups. ,,6 Pluralist theory invests the existing set of
interest groups with implicit legitimacy in the democratic process, premised on
a faith that groups manifest significant interests in society that demand and
deserve representation. If relevant interest groups are properly represented in
the pluralist system, the government will accurately reflect an amalgam of
public interest to which every group contributes a piece.11 7 Courts and
commentators thus have focused heavily on the normative question of how to
maintain a pluralistic competitive forum for political groups to fight for their
fair share of political representation." 8
115. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRAcY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980) (describing the judiciary as a
referee within the political process).
116. Lani Guinier, [Ejracing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 1o8 HARV. L. REV. 109, 137
(1994). Justice Stevens, for instance, argues for just such a comprehensive legal conception
of political representation that encompasses all political groups, from racial minorities to
political parties. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins' Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting
Rights, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 521 (1996). In short, Justice Stevens proposes a uniform doctrinal
approach to questions of group-based vote dilution that focuses on the dilutive intent of the
government and looks to deviation from usual practice to discern such intent. See Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 335-37 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 753-55 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90-91
(198o) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491,
510-26 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying in practice a similar test); Cousins v. City
Council, 466 F.2d 830, 859 (7th Cit. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (proposing a similar
test).
117. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 115, at 152 ("[I]t is of the essence of democracy to allow the various
persons and groups that make up our society to decide which others they wish to combine
with in shaping legislation."); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1218 (1996) ("[U]nless black voters are able to elect
candidates of their choice, their particular bundle of interests, for which race serves as a
shorthand, may be undersatisfied relative to the number of individuals asserting these
interests and the intensities of their preferences.").
118. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfirter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
election law requires courts "to choose among competing bases of representation-
ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy"); HANNA FENICHEL
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 167 (1967) (contending that any concept of
representation rests on one's "metapolitics-his broad conception of human nature, human
society, and political life"); Keith J. Bybee, Democratic Theory and Race-Conscious
Redistricting: The Supreme Court Constructs the American Voter, in THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: NEw INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS 219, 222 (Howard Gillman &
Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) ("Since representation can be interpreted in a wide range of
ways, the kind of political community to be forged by representative government is itself
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The fundamental complication with pluralist theory, however, is that the
process by which individuals adopt political identification, and by which
political groups form, is highly contingent and indeterminate. The pluralist
focus on groups and how they are represented, rather than on how they form
in the first place, tends to put the cart before the horse. Far more consistent
with democratic contestation than pluralist theory, the lessons of public choice
theory demonstrate that the political division of the public into orderly
groupings is far from a prepolitical or well-defined ideological process." 9 A
theory of democratic contestation shifts the focus from the legal treatment of
extant groups to how those groups, among the multitude of possibilities,
emerge as politically relevant in the first place. This shift in focus calls attention
to how a process of democratic contestation solves the inherent challenges to
collective action in mass politics.
Bottom-up coordination among likeminded citizens simply does not occur
spontaneously within a mass public that is diffuse, disorganized, and
heterogeneous. In everyday politics, before individual citizens are able to
coordinate effectively in a pluralistic fashion, they need to overcome daunting
obstacles to collective action. First, average individual citizens tend to be
"rationally ignorant" about politics in the absence of political education
through a process of democratic contestation. 2 The unsubsidized costs of
acquiring reliable, current political information are high in the face of the many
more pressing demands of everyday life. Without leadership help, the average
citizen struggles to identify the critical issues of the day, much less develop a
position on them and decide where she aligns with fellow citizens.'
In the individual calculus of a typical voter, the instrumental benefit reaped
from personal investment, as an individual citizen with a single vote, is quite
small relative to the costs.'22 Of course, many citizens choose to get involved in
open to debate. The result is that representational debates are always anchored in disputes
over the nature of the political community.").
iig. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST
POPULISM (1982).
12o. See ANTHONY DOwNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 207-37 (1957); SCHUMPETER,
supra note 82, at 262.
121. See generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTt KFETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 213-15 (1996); PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 92, at 9-15.
122. See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND DEMOCRACY 14-23 (1970)
(discussing the "infinitesimal" instrumental value of voting); DONALD P. GREEN & LAN
SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 47-71 (1994); Andrew Gelman, Gary
King & W. John Boscardin, Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred:
When Is Your Vote Decisive?, 93 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 1, 2 (1998) (noting the tiny direct
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politics out of personal interest, ambition, or a sense of civic duty. Most
citizens, however, are rationally ignorant of the most basic facts about public
affairs. Given the extraordinarily small chances that any single vote will be
decisive in an election, the average citizen chooses rationally to address her
everyday concerns first and decides that it is simply not worth the necessary
time and resources to become politically well-informed." 3  Quite
understandably, she remains a "civic slacker," deficient in information, interest,
and sophistication about public affairs. 4 While capable of responding sensibly
to guidance from trusted political leaders, the average voter needs information
and direction from a process of democratic contestation to be brought back
within the political debate. As leaders compete for the hearts and minds of
citizens in their rhetorical campaigning, they provide political information at
low cost to the public on terms the public can understand and afford.
Second, the indeterminacy of pluralist politics can be overwhelming
without meaningful simplification by a process of democratic contestation.
Pluralist theory presupposes the division of citizens into groups, or factions,
"united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest."'
However, there is no intuitive prepolitical certainty about the correct lines of
political division."' The public can potentially divide into a manifold array of
politically relevant groups, because the available axes for political agreement
and disagreement are virtually unlimited. Larry Alexander explains that "[a]s
voters we are Democrats and Republicans, blacks and whites, males and
females. But we are also hawks and doves, redistributionists and laissez-faire
personal value gained from voting given the exceptionally low probability that one's vote
will be decisive).
123. See Kang, supra note 17, at 1153; cf. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75
ECON. J. 493, 495-98 (1965) (discussing a household production function in which
individuals allocate time across various needs and demands).
124. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REv. 893,
903 (1998).
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
126. See MICHAEL C. DAwsON, BEHIND THE MuLE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRIcAN-AMERicAN
POLITICS 12 (1994) ("In advanced industrial societies, however, citizens have multiple
identities, as the pluralists have been pointing out for much of the second half of the
twentieth century. Further, many scholars have pointed out that preferences are not
exogenous -they do not fall like manna from the sky. Preferences are clearly endogenous.");
MARTHA MINow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF 20 (1997) (referring to the "complex interactions
among people, historical settings, and events" inherent in group identification). Martha
Minow concludes that "[e]ach of us is a unique member of the sets of endless groupings
that touch us." Id. at 39. In politics, "for strategic purposes we may choose to affiliate along
one or a few lines of group membership, but these lines may shift as our strategies and goals
change." Id.
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advocates. We are atheist, agnostic, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and
Buddhist, all of various stripes. We are trade unionists and managers, Main
Streeters and cosmopoles."12 7 People are similar and different in so many
significant ways that it is difficult for a common consensus to coalesce about
even which similarities and differences are the most important ones for
political identification. ' This contingency within complex society both gives
leaders opportunity and necessitates leaders to order mass politics.
Put simply, political division is endogenous to the political process. How
people divide politically is itself a product of politics. Political alignments are
not the inevitable bottom-up product of individuals coming together as an
organic consequence of shared interests and ideology.2 9 Subgroups of people
share all types of differences and similarities that could be understood as
politically relevant, but the process by which certain differences and similarities
emerge as the most important and relevant lines of political differentiation is
not obvious. Intuitively important demographic factors, such as gender,
religion, and education, have far less impact on people's politics than one
might expect.'3° What is more, the potential lines of political differentiation are
in constant flux, as the politics that they bear continually changes and redefines
the possibilities. 3' Democratic contestation is the process by which leaders help
guide the public through the drawing and constant revision of these lines.
127. Larry Alexander, Lost in the Political Thicket, 41 FLA. L. REv. 563, 575 (1989); see also Akhil
Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 203 ("You're
never going to be able to cast a vote for someone who looks like you along every
dimension -if you are, say, a conservative black Catholic woman, you might have to decide
which of those attributes is the most essential part of your political identity."); Karlan &
Levinson, supra note 117, at 1204 (noting that the "list of potential criteria for creating voting
groups is exceedingly long"). Political alignment necessitates this sort of choice,
disaggregating and weighing the many components of personal identity.
la8. See, e.g., Jon Gertner, The Very, Very Personal Is the Political, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2004, § 6
(Magazine), at 42, 46-47 ("To look at this country the way direct marketers might, through
the prism of data, is to see an America of almost uncountable religious and ethnic
segmentations, or a country of homeowners, parents, college graduates, high-school
dropouts, entrepreneurs, fishermen, regular voters, absentee voters and irregular voters.").
i2g. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1o63, 1074 (198o) ("One cannot speak of 'groups' as though society were
objectively subdivided along lines that are just there to be discerned.").
130. See DONALD GREEN, BRADLEY PALMQUIST &EPJC SCHICKLER, PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS:
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS 3 (2002) ("Of the seemingly
'fundamental' social identities, only race is a powerful predictor of electoral choice.").
131. See, e.g., SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY:
Civic VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLrICS 170 (1995) (observing that "what constitutes a
politically relevant characteristic changes with new times and new circumstances").
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Third, mass politics requires political organization that a process of
democratic contestation must provide. Even if everyone agrees about the most
important basis for political division, everyone also must know that everyone
else shares the same thoughts and then act with them in a coordinated way.'
3 2
Political mobilization, in short, requires large-scale coordination. A particular
subset of people must perceive themselves as a group and also know to act
upon that shared sense all at once in coordination with their cohort. This
shared sense of group commonality comes spontaneously without cost and
external direction only on rare occasions.
Instead, for mass coordination to emerge, a leader must bear the costs of
organization and focus the attention of a diffuse, disconnected collection of
individuals.'33 A leader must work to communicate across the cohort and
convince it to act together in coordinated fashion. Otherwise, the presence of
many disconnected people with diverse, undeveloped positions along so many
dimensions makes spontaneous coordination decidedly improbable.'
Similarly situated citizens may act in disparate ways that collectively lead to the
least preferred outcome, because they do not see, or at least do not prioritize,
the commonalities among them. They may fall victim to preference cycling in
which even those with similar preferences may struggle to achieve lasting
agreement. 3 '
132. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 77
(Adrienne Koch ed., Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (1840) (remarks of James Madison) (noting
that group formation is complicated when there are "so great a number of interests [and]
parties, that in the (first] place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to... be apt
to unite in the pursuit of it"); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19
J.L. & ECON. 211, 213 (1976) ("It is not enough for the successful group to recognize its
interests; it must organize to translate this interest into support for the politician who will
implement it.").
133. See HARDIN, supra note 119, at 16-37 (discussing the difficulty of collective action and central
importance of "political entrepreneurs" in group coordination); JOHN W. KINGDON,
AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICtES 129-30, 188-93 (1984) (describing the role of
"policy entrepreneurs" in promoting issues throughout the policy-making process); Robert
H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 11-15 (1969)
(explaining the role of "entrepreneurs/organizers" in investing up-front capital necessary to
overcome problems of collective action).
134. Absent external coordination from democratic contestation, they will remain disorganized,
as what Mancur Olson describes as a "latent group." OLSON, supra note 107, at 48-51.
135. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 63-83 (2d ed.
1963); DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMrITEES AND ELECTIONS 46-51 (1958). Even
worse, the difficulties of coordination can preclude collective action even when a desire for
collective action is overwhelmingly and desperately shared by a vast majority. A dramatic
example is how the lack of information and coordination delayed the fall of communism in
Eastern Europe, where Eastern Europeans were unable to coordinate until shared
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Fortunately, this very indeterminacy begets democratic potential under a
theory of democratic contestation. Precisely because the landscape of political
organization is unfixed, perpetually susceptible .to change, and desperate for
direction, there is opportunity for political leaders to fill the void and attempt
to organize their own constituencies. Rather than assuming a pluralistic
political world neatly divided into predetermined groups vying for their share
of the pie, a theory of democratic contestation recognizes an uncertain political
world in flux, full of deliberative potential and disorganization for political
leaders to engage.136 In other words, the indeterminacy of collective action
permits and encourages the process of democratic contestation.
Even longstanding institutions like political parties feature constant
adaptation, internal rivalry, and immense institutional reorganization over
short periods of time as competing party leaders vie for relative influence.
137
Despite the seeming essentiality of political parties, a theory of democratic
contestation recognizes parties fundamentally as informal alliances among
political leaders with overlapping interests who see mutual benefit in
nonbinding collaboration. It is important not to overestimate the institutional
cohesion of parties or to invest them with representational interests as a united
whole."38 As I have argued in previous work, party leaders compete constantly
to advance their individual agendas against rivals doing the same both within
and across party lines.'39 What is more, the form, substance, and membership
preferences were revealed and suddenly brought forth enormous change in shockingly quick
fashion once coordination was facilitated. See Timur Kuran, Now Out of Never: The Element
of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989, 44 WORLD POL. 7 (1991); Susanne
Lohmann, The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig,
East Germany, 1989-91, 47 WORLD POL. 42 (1994).
136. Of course, not all possible lines of political differentiation are equally salient. Many recur
with frequency across societies, most prominently race, as discussed further in Part III.
However, as many have established, even racial meaning is socially constructed, and race's
political salience has varied with attempts by leaders to mobilize voters along racial lines.
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMMENT. 295, 311-17 (2OOO) (arguing against the mistake of assuming the permanence and
inelasticity of race's sociopolitical force even within the historical context of the Jim Crow
South).
137. See Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IowA L. REv. 131, 141-
73 (2oo5) (describing political parties as evolving "supralegal creatures" and identifying
intraparty politics as a vital form of political rivalry).
138. See Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safeguards, 96
Nw. U. L. Rav. 977, 981 (2oo2) (declaring that parties lack "any fundamental, enduring, and
essential nature").
139. Kang, supra note 137, at 142-46.
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of even the two major parties changes incredibly over time as both inter- and
intraparty competition plays out. 140
In other words, the process of democratic contestation occurs not only
through competition between parties, electoral and otherwise, but importantly
and valuably within parties. Parties are useful tools that leaders use to
coordinate with provisional allies, simplify political information for the public,
and organize the indeterminacy of polyarchic politics, but only insofar as
leaders continue to find them useful for advancing themselves in the larger
process of democratic contestation. Political leaders act critically as
entrepreneurs, to survey the public and strategize how best to offer appeals that
will attract citizens to them and their leadership. Parties are an important
element within the process of democratic contestation, but only one part of it.
The law of democracy, under the VRA and elsewhere, should encourage
the natural tendency among political leaders to coordinate the mass public.
Democratic contestation is the process by which politics remains timely and
responsive, constantly presenting the average citizen with new issues,
questions, and understandings about public affairs in advancement of the
general welfare. The process of democratic contestation helps coordinate and
simplify the political landscape throughout the full range of political discourse.
The next Part concentrates on the "thick" divisions of racial polarization and
group identification in the pluralist process, but the process of democratic
contestation also includes relatively narrow issue-specific divisions of all sorts
that crosscut the public into provisional factions defined entirely by agreement
or disagreement about isolated concerns. The process of democratic
contestation is therefore broad and multilayered, covering particularized debate
about individual issues, as well as the broader process by which leaders try to
convince people how to aggregate those issue-specific positions into thicker
sensibilities about political self-identification and group membership. The
dynamism and vibrancy of democratic contestation, rather than electoral
competition or the pluralistic fair treatment of groups, should be a touchstone
for the VRA and the rest of the law of democracy.
140. See John F. Bibby, State Party Organizations, in THE PARTIES RESPOND 19, 19-46 (L. Sandy
Maisel ed., 4 th ed. 2002) (describing major changes to state parties since the 196os); Morris
P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 4o-Year Retrospective, 24 POL. BEHAV. 93, 103 (2002)
(describing parties as malleable entities that party leaders "invent and reinvent to solve
problems that face them at particular times in history" (citing JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY
PARTIES? THE ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1985)));
Paul S. Hermson, National Parry Organizations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, in
THE PARTIES RESPOND, supra, at 47, 47-78 (describing major changes to national parties
since the 196os); see also supra note 27 (describing the realignment of the major parties
following passage of the VRA).
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The next Part applies a theory of democratic contestation to the special
problem of race and the VRA. However, democratic contestation, as both
theory and process, should be valuable in many other domains that I do not
address directly here, but do not mean to foreclose. The law of democracy must
guard against disruption of the process of democratic contestation as a primary
normative aim, whether it is in partisan gerrymandering, campaign finance
law, or other areas of election law. This Article provides only a first exploration
of democratic contestation as a theoretic tool for understanding law and
democratic governance.
III. RACE AND DEMOCRATIC CONTESTATION
This Part explains how a theory of democratic contestation informs
normative perspectives on race, majority-minority districting under the VRA,
and LULAC v. Perry. A theory of democratic contestation shifts the normative
focus from the usual zero-sum calculus of who gets how much in racial group
representation, to a new focus on the quality and character of politics that
emerge from the process of democratic contestation. A theory of democratic
contestation identifies the paralytic effect of race on political discourse as the
real harm under conditions of racial polarization and identifies the need for the
VRA as a race-specific remedy.
A theory of democratic contestation enables one to see past the
conventional frameworks of electoral competition and pluralistic
representation and to appreciate how the VRA can positively affect
participatory politics in a procompetitive fashion. The VRA, through majority-
minority districting, may generate dynamic new processes of democratic
contestation that break free from the stagnant discourse, fixated along the
single axis of race, otherwise predominant under conditions of racial
polarization for both the white majority and racial minority.
Finally, this Part argues that the Court in LULAC v. Perry is misguided in
its handling of the Texas redistricting if it hopes to animate and engage the
electorate as it aspired to do in that decision. A theory of democratic
contestation reveals that LULAC was confused in its theory and
counterproductive in its result with respect to the most controversial emerging
issues of the day under the VRA: electoral competition, cultural compactness,
and coalition districting.
A. The Politics of Racial Polarization
Under the Court's methodology for section 2 of the VRA, racially polarized
voting occurs when the racial minority group is politically cohesive such that
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its members usually vote for the same candidate, and the white majority votes
as a bloc to enable it to defeat the minority group's preferred candidate.1 41 In
other words, racial polarization includes a pattern of bloc voting in which the
white majority and racial minority consistently oppose each other along racial
lines. 1 42 Under these conditions, the VRA requires the government to draw
district lines that offer racial minorities a fair chance to elect their candidates of
choice, traditionally through the use of majority-minority districts.1 43 The
prevalence of racial polarization, particularly in the South, is undergirded by a
remarkable gulf in public opinion and perceived political interest across racial
lines well-documented by political scientists.1"
Political theorists and commentators, though, have struggled with the basic
question of why racial minorities should be exempted from the usual rule of
majoritarianism. In a pluralist democracy, the majority is supposed to triumph
in the political process, and minority groups are generally expected to lose. 145
Nonetheless, Congress specifically intended the VRA to protect and represent
African Americans as a historically disempowered group that was
141. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized
Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 1833, 1845-56 (1992) (discussing the emergence of the racial polarization requirement
after the 1982 amendments).
142. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 82-1o8; Bernard Grofman, A Primer on Racial Bloc
Voting Analysis, in THE REAL Y2K PROBLEM: CENSUS 2000 DATA AND REDISTRICTING
TECHNOLOGY 43-80 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2000); see also Pildes, supra note 7, at 1373
(stating that racially polarized voting remains a "pervasive fact of political life in the South"
that makes descriptive representation for racial minorities improbable in the face of
persistent majority opposition).
143. See generally Gerken, supra note 18.
144. See DAWSON, supra note 126; DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR:
RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996); see also DAVID T. CANON, RACE,
REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BLACK
MAJORITY DISTRICTS 20-59 (1999) ; SWAIN, supra note 19, at 5-19; Guy-Uriel E. Charles,
Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L.
REv. 1209, 1232-39 (2003).
145. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (expressing concern that vote dilution
becomes "a mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls"); Bruce E. Cain, Voting Rights
and Democratic Theory: Toward a Color-Blind Society?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY
VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 268 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992) ("[I]f the system has worked for years on the premise that
disproportionate outcomes were the price of single-member districts and simple plurality
winners, then why should this right be given to blacks and Latinos?"); Issacharoff & Pildes,
supra note 8, at 701 (observing the task is "to distinguish contexts in which minorities lose
elections in the same manner as any other insufficiently powerful interest groups").
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systematically stripped of opportunities for political representation. 146 The long
history of racial discrimination and political oppression, many argued, justifies
special representation for race in the political process that reverses the usual
deference to majority rule. 147 In the same vein, John Hart Ely cited the power of
racial animus as a justification for race's special treatment. Ely argued that
racial minorities' discreteness and insularity render them particularly
vulnerable to discriminatory prejudice by the majority and therefore deserving
of special representation in the political process.' 48 For this reason, Ely argued
in favor of race-conscious measures as a necessary remedy for the likelihood of
racial disadvantage in the political process.
149
The problem is that public-choice theory suggests exactly the opposite
conclusion."' Discrete, insular minorities are better prepared to organize and
coordinate group action, all other things being equal. They are smaller in size,
with more homogeneous interests, and therefore enjoy advantages in collective
action, at least relative to the larger, more diffuse majority."s' As a result, Bruce
Ackerman reasons that racial minorities should be better positioned to compete
in the political process by exploiting heterogeneity and disunity in the majority
population."12 Under this account, the internal homogeneity and cohesion of a
racial minority, to the degree that they are successfully maintained, are
146. See Issacharoff, supra note 111, at 886 (observing that the VRA was designed to redress the
"central features of the black experience in the U.S.-in particular, a history of de jure
discrimination and segregation"); see also James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race
Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose vs. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69
VA. L. REV. 633, 677 (1983) (noting that the VRA was "designed as a remedial device to
overcome a history of obstructionist resistance to the enfranchisement of blacks"). See
generally ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(2005); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863-1877
(1988); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); KOUSSER, supra note 22.
147. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note III, at 885-86 (explaining that the VRA premised its
protections on a "history of discrimination-bred disadvantage").
148. ELY, supra note 115, at 152-6o.
149. Id. at 153 (arguing that race-conscious measures are justified when racial groups are known
"to be the object of widespread vilification, groups we know others (specifically those who
control the legislative process) might wish to injure").
150. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REV. 713, 724-26 (1985)
(replying to Ely that discrete and insular groups actually exercise disproportionate political
strength); see also OLSON, supra note 107, at 22-36; Peltzman, supra note 132.
151. See HARDIN, supra note 119, at 38-49 (describing the advantages of small group size);
OLSON, supra note 107, at 22-36, 44-65 (explaining the surprising tendency for the
exploitation of the great by the small); Ackerman, supra note 15o, at 724-26.
152. Ackerman, supra note 15o.
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competitive advantages. Far from meriting special dispensation in theory, racial
minorities ought to benefit from the dynamics of collective action, as more
compact, efficient contestants in the polyarchic commotion of pluralist politics.
A theory of democratic contestation offers a new defense of the special
treatment of race in the democratic process -one grounded in these dynamics
of collective action. Smaller size and homogeneity of interests do advantage
discrete, insular groups, but not when it comes to race. The power of racial
animus, which Ely emphasized, helps position race as an exceptionally durable
and powerful point of coordination in politics. Under conditions of racial
polarization, racial prejudice shores up in-group cohesion within a
heterogeneous white majority such that even individual whites who share
common interests with a homogeneous racial minority deny that commonality
and, contrary to those common interests, refuse to break from the white
majority. The usual advantages of internal homogeneity and cohesion among a
minority group fail in the case of racial polarization, because white in-group
cohesion by definition trumps countervailing lines of commonality that would
otherwise matter in the pluralist process. The history of racial discrimination
and oppression, which many cite as independent justification for race-
conscious remedies, evidences the overwhelming power of race as just such a
dominant point of coordination in politics when racial polarization occurs.
"Race prejudice," as one commentator put simply, "divides groups that have
much in common.., and unites groups (whites, rich and poor) that have little
else in common than their antagonism for the racial minority."'53 Racial
minorities, under conditions of racial polarization, thus have been and continue
to be "barred from the pluralist's bazaar,"1 4 unable to participate fully in the
contemplated process of democratic interchange.
Racial polarization therefore represents a rare case where mass coordination
appears to occur almost reflexively along the dominant axis of race."'5 I do not
claim that race constitutes a prepolitical or otherwise "natural" division, nor is
it necessary to argue that race inevitably emerges as the defining political
division or take a position on the basic causes of race's centrality under
conditions of racial polarization. On one hand, it may be correct that race's
salience arises from the "bottom up," deriving from the individual preferences
153. Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60
CAL. L. REV. 275, 315 (1972).
154. ELY, supra note 115, at 152.
155. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 117, at 1218 (arguing that polarization is generated by the
decisions of African American, Latino, and other minority voters "to unite politically and to
'pull, haul, and trade' their way into electoral power" (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1020 (1994))).
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of citizens."56 On the other hand, race's salience may be a responsive function of
leadership mobilization along the most historically well-established line of
division.' sT For purposes of this Article, I principally seek to recognize and
identify race's centrality in the way that citizens think about politics under
conditions of racial polarization. Race, at least under conditions of racial
polarization, stands out as an almost unique exception to the usual
unpredictability of mass coordination that gives life to the process of
democratic contestation.
As a consequence, when racial polarization prevails, race deserves special
treatment because it threatens to preempt the healthy competitive process of
democratic contestation. The normal dynamics of collective action are inverted
such that the usual space and opportunity for democratic contestation in large
part disappears. Race predominates as an almost determinative political
division.' s Under a theory of democratic contestation, a critical harm of racial
polarization is not necessarily that politics is discussed in explicitly racial terms,
but rather that the competitive imperative of racial polarization- that of
maintaining racial in-group cohesion above other considerations- demands
that racial communities avoid exploration of issues and concerns that carry the
risk of dividing them along nonracial lines. Racial polarization thereby
constricts the scope of political discourse to a subset of familiar issues
unthreatening to the dominant racial alignment and removes other issues from
thorough consideration. Racial polarization may silence consideration of
important public concerns that otherwise deserve and require attention within
racially polarized communities and in the process deprive the larger polity,
outside those communities, of important voices in the broader debate.
156. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note iii, at 887-88; Karlan & Levinson, supra note 117, at 1217-19.
157. See, e.g., Charles, supra note 144, at 1225-26 (describing the Court's "top-down
understanding of racial identity claims"); see also Jeffrey A. Roy, Carolene Products: A
Game-Theoretic Approach, 2002 BYU L. REv. 53 (arguing from a game-threoretic perspective
that race offers a particularly easy focal point for stable coordination).
158. To say that white and African American political views are racially polarized is not to imply
that African American (or white) political views are monolithic. See CANON, supra note 144,
at 94-97. That is, the polarized divide between whites and African Americans obscures the
fact that there is great intragroup diversity of political views for both whites and African
Americans. On nonracial issues, whites and African Americans display the same level of
ideological dispersion and diversity. See id. at 30. The rest of the Article argues that a
majority-minority district, by relieving the pressure of racial polarization, permits white and
minority voters to rediscover this commonality on nonracial grounds and develop alternate
frameworks for encountering politics. See GUINIER & ToRREs, supra note 78, at 11-31
(describing the essential need in a democracy for citizens to identify cross-racially and
choose freely among multiple political identities).
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While the power of racial animus and the history of racial discrimination
and oppression are clearly central to race's exceptionalism, they provide only
part (albeit a critical part) of the normative story. The present debate
underappreciates how racial animus, its history, and its ongoing legacy
continue to damage the healthy operation of democratic politics. Race requires
special treatment, not simply because of the history of discrimination and
oppression, but because the same factors that contributed to, and are now
bolstered by, that history help make racial polarization acutely disruptive to the
political discourse at the heart of democratic contestation. Almost by
definition, the special circumstances of racial polarization mean that citizens
can regard their political choices, often literally, only in the context of black and
white, forgoing opportunities for democratic contestation and overlooking
other potential lines of commonality and difference among them.
Racial polarization thus stalls the process of democratic contestation in
which the uncertainty of coordination motivates leadership to stir up vibrant,
energetic politics. Racial polarization in the electoral context is devastating
because it is symptomatic of a deeper problem-a discursive polarization in
which the political discourse passively maintains public divisions along racial
lines.5 9 For profound and deeply rooted sociopolitical reasons, race under
circumstances of racial polarization is the conversation stopper. Politics may
freeze along the historically dominant axis of race, removing incentives for
political leaders to challenge the public with new choices and understandings
inconsistent with the entrenched racial alignment.16' Race, under conditions of
racial polarization, therefore thoroughly undermines the mass participatory
process of democratic contestation. Although the VRA definition of racial
polarization focuses on voting, consistent patterns of racially polarized voting
have causes rooted in, as well as pervasive consequences for, the character of
1S9. Thanks to Jennifer Nou for the term "discursive polarization." It is important to clarify as
well that discursive polarization need not be defined by (though it may be characterized as)
an exclusive fixation on explicitly racialized issues, such as affirmative action. Instead,
discursive polarization is defined by static sets of disagreements that divide the polity
consistently along racial lines, whether or not the issues themselves are explicitly racialized,
and reinforce racially polarized politics where both whites and the racial minority block
themselves into permanent opposition along racial lines.
16o. See also Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4 ("Race, unfortunately, or
fortunately, depending on your perspective, still defines the political interests of many
Americans, and it should not surprise us that this is true given the fact that we live in such a
racially defined world."). See generally DAWSON, supra note 126 (showing that African
Americans overwhelmingly subordinate political identity along class and other lines to racial
identity).
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the public discourse that implicate all forms of associated political behavior,
including political preferences, self-identity, and political participation.
It is important to emphasize that the VRA imposes majority-minority
districts only when racial polarization is empirically demonstrable -where the
white majority and racial minority take on self-conscious group identity that
submerges other aspects of political self-identity for both groups.' 6' The VRA's
imposition of majority-minority districts simply does not apply as a matter of
law where racial polarization is not evident. This Article, using a theory of
democratic contestation, articulates a new normative rationale for the VRA's
usual methodology as it applies to demonstrated patterns of racial polarization.
The traditional practice of maintaining majority-minority districts under the
VRA in those instances should be maintained, even where electoral
competition may be diminished, because a theory of democratic contestation
provides a new explanation of race's exceptionality and the countervailing need
for majority-minority districts where racial polarization prevails.
A theory of democratic contestation allows a reunderstanding of why race is
excepted from normal pluralistic politics. It provides a reconception of legal
carve outs under the VRA not simply as representational guarantees, but as
tailored remedies for an exceptional breakdown in the healthy competitive
interplay of democratic contestation. A theory of democratic contestation
explains why race requires special consideration in the form of the VRA and
the design of political institutions as they come before the Court in cases like
LULAC. Race, when left unchecked, may be the unique sociopolitical
characteristic that enables an ever-enduring political alignment across a mass
public that solves the usual instability of collective action in democratic
politics. 62 Under conditions of racial polarization, the determinative force of
race as a source of coordination demands race-conscious intervention to restart
democratic contestation. It is less a failure of representation, as John Hart Ely
framed it, than a failure of democratic contestation and political discourse. The
need to protect the process of democratic contestation from the polarizing
effect of race distinguishes race as exceptional in pluralistic politics.163
161. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 117, at 1216.
16z. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, io8 HARv. L. REV. 1003, 1046-64 (1995) (describing the
powerful psychological underpinnings of race discrimination as a means of status
production and detailing the accompanying social psychology literature).
163. See FRYMER, supra note 22, at lo ("Precisely because racism is so divisive and repelling,
African Americans are in the unique position of not being able to join in the give-and-take of
normal coalition politics."). Obviously, the race-specific purpose of the VRA also
distinguishes the treatment of race from other important, potentially divisive sociopolitical
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In fact, the singular power of racial animus, as demonstrated by the long
history of extraordinary discrimination and oppression, makes clear the terrible
disruption of democratic contestation and its effects. The history of racial
politics suggests that the polarized white majority is prone to unify behind
racial lines and actively suppress other political disagreements precisely to
sustain racial discipline. Racial polarization serves as a self-disciplining
nonaggression pact, in which polarized white leaders forgo competitive efforts
of democratic contestation and subordinate disagreement in the maintenance
of racial hierarchy. 16 4 An overwhelming harm in the White Primary Cases,6' for
instance, was certainly the political exclusion of African American voters.
However, commentators neglect the closely associated problem from the
standpoint of democratic theory that both white and African American
communities lost opportunities to engage in democratic contestation across
and within racial lines.'66 White Democrats in the White Primary Cases were
willing to submerge their ideological and sociopolitical differences, sacrificing
the rich opportunities for democratic contestation, in a determined effort to
remain racially unified. 167 Racial polarization provided the exceptional
differences such as religion, ideology, and class. In other societies, alternate bases of political
differentiation may dominate in similar fashion analogous to racial polarization in the
United States. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 573-77 (19 8 5)
(describing deep tribal and other forms of ethnic conflict requiring consociational
arrangements in Asia and Africa).
164. See Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133, 153-56 (1994)
(describing Jim Crow practices as cartel behavior); Daria Roithmayr, Racial Cartels (Univ. of
S. Cal. Law Sch. Law and Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 66, 2007), available at
http:/Aaw.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1o67&context=usclwps (characterizing
racial discrimination in politics along these lines).
165. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Gravey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927).
166. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 8, at 655-68 (describing white cohesion across
ideological lines during the White Primary Cases but defining the White Primary Cases in
terms of electoral competition); Pildes, supra note 13, at 1621 (suggesting that judicial
intervention in the White Primary Cases would have been unnecessary under conditions of
partisan competition); Roithmayr, supra note 164, at 23-31 (describing racial exclusion in the
White Primary Cases as anticompetitive mutual disarmament).
167. See KEY, supra note 93, at 533 (concluding that the effect of Reconstruction was "the wiping
out of party differences between the whites, formerly divided between the Whig and
Democratic parties"); KouSSER, supra note 22, at 16-17, 25 (describing economic divisions
among Southern whites in the early Jim Crow South); C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF
THE NEW SOUTH 1877-1913, at 321-49 (1951) (explaining how shared support for white
supremacy unified whites within the Democratic Party and overrode economic and political
rifts exposed by Southern populism); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM
CROW 60-77 (2d rev. ed. 1966) (same).
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circumstance where deep racial divisions help cement into place an entrenched
majority and thereby disable the process of democratic contestation for both
whites and African Americans.
For precisely this reason, majority-minority districting on the basis of race
may be procompetitive - on democratic contestation grounds - rather than
anticompetitive, as many suppose.'68 It can end discursive polarization and
restart the competitive process of democratic contestation inside the district for
both white and minority communities. Martha Minow writes that electoral
structures ought "to permit self-identification by individuals as temporary,
contingent members of self-formed groups.', 6, Majority-minority districting
allows citizens to do exactly that. Though based on race, majority-minority
districts relieve citizens of the burden of focusing on race. Majority-minority
districts liberate them to think politically beyond race by acknowledging and
controlling for race. That is, state recognition of race through majority-
minority districting does not preempt political self-constitution. Quite the
opposite, majority-minority districting may facilitate the community's
reengagement with political self-constitution, at least at the district level,
through a healthy process of democratic contestation that transcends race.
Within a majority-minority district, minority members who once banded
together defensively against the white majority are liberated to explore
intragroup differences and disagreements. In this sense, majority-minority
districts and the VRA truly grant the racial minority the chance to consider a
full range of pluralistic opportunities. Once a majority-minority district
obviates the need to cohere against racially polarized opposition, minority
citizens can consider more nuanced differences among them than would have
otherwise been advisable. Rather than coordinating behind a single minority
candidate of choice against the white majority, the minority community is
freed to choose the best among several candidates, each with distinct
alternatives and platforms. Minority citizens may be forced, whether willing or
not, to push past "the simple fact of their racial affiliation to make legislative
choices."'7° While some commentators claim that majority-minority districts
may retard the development of normal, pluralist politics by making districts
safely held by the minority,'' a theory of democratic contestation reveals how
168. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 16, at 118o ("Majority-minority districts are invariably also
noncompetitive districts.").
169. MINOW, supra note 126, at 96.
170. Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 497 (1988) (discussing the need for and value of
intraminority debate when race is an indeterminate guide for political choice).
171. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 6, at 97-99.
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that safety liberates the racial minority to explore nonracial dimensions of
political identity and disagreement in a genuinely pluralist fashion.
In short, majority-minority districting can be transformative of process and
ultimately of preferences themselves. For the African American community to
debate seriously the potentially divisive issue of civil unions, for instance,
partisan considerations must be bracketed from the discussion.1 72 As long as
the debate occurs within the normal context characteristic of racially polarized
voting, African Americans may instinctively return to the historically familiar
pattern of deciding along racial lines. 73 That is, whatever substantive debate
that might occur regarding civil unions is drowned out in the whirlpool of
racial politics in the end. It is only in the safe place of a racial guarantee that
policy and political discussion unaligned with race may flourish. By generating
what Heather Gerken calls "second-order diversity"' 74 in the form of racial
guarantees, majority-minority districts can foster healthy exploration of the full
political diversity and dissent within a racial community. Majority-minority
districts destabilize the usual relationships of power and enable both white and
minority citizens to experience democracy from fresh perspectives.' s7 Majority-
minority districts provide a space where "members of the majority are
temporarily deprived of the comfort-and power- associated with their
majority status" and where "members of the electoral minority are not
permanent dissenters, but sometimes participants in the governance
process."''1 6 White voters constitute electoral majorities at state and national
levels of government beyond the single legislative district, 177 but minority
172. For discussion of the tension within the African American community regarding the issue of
gay marriage, see Esther Kaplan, The Religious Right's Sense of Siege Is Fueling a Resurgence,
NATION, July 5, 2004, at 33, which discusses the divisiveness of gay marriage within the
Democratic Party. See also David Mattson, The Struggle To Redefine Marriage, INSIGHT, Aug.
5-18, 2003, at 30 (noting African American support for a federal marriage amendment); State
of the Union, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2003, at 29 (identifying gay marriage as a wedge issue).
173. See Quentin Kidd et al., Black Voters, Black Candidates, and Social Issues: Does Party
Identification Matter?, 88 Soc. Sci. Q7 165 (2007); Quentin Kidd et al., Social Conservatism
in the 2004 Election: Assessing the Pull of Values Issues on African American Voters (Sept.
1-4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
174. See Gerken, supra note 102, at 11o6-o8; see also McAdams, supra note 162, at 1049
(explaining how fixing the racial minority group as the relevant voting "majority" within a
majority-minority district helps counteract the subordination effort underlying race
discrimination).
175. See Gerken, supra note 102, at 1151 (praising second-order diversity for "help[ing] vary
participatory experiences over the course of a civic life").
176. Id. at 115o.
177. See LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 5-7 (1994) (advocating turn taking); Gerken, supra note 102,
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voters usually constitute an electoral majority at only the local or district level,
if at all.' 7' The majority-minority district "turns the tables" and provides both
groups with a new vantage point on governance and democracy that is useful,
educational, and empowering at least at one level of government. 79 Even
better, the fresh perspectives that emerge from the discourse in a majority-
minority district may be particularly distinctive and offer innovations that
spread, reframe, and advance political discourse outside the majority-minority
district. 1so
More empirical research is needed before any definitive claims are possible,
but consistent with a theory of democratic contestation, there is growing
empirical evidence that majority-minority districting facilitates minority
political participation and turnout. Criticizing majority-minority districting,
Lani Guinier argues that majority-minority districts may increase voter apathy
and decrease participation because "one can certainly argue that safe seats
at 1142-6o (arguing that allowing the minority to "turn the tables" offers a form of second-
order diversity useful in democracy); George Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of
Representative Democracy, 91 ETHICS 357, 360-61 (1981) (praising taking turns standing for
the whole).
178. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or Accommodation: The Changing
Supreme Court and Religious Freedom, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 893, 942 (1991) (noting that racial
minorities are underrepresented nationally but are achieving greater representational success
at the municipal or local level).
179. In a controversial twist during April 2007, the state of Nebraska divided Omaha public
schools into three racially identifiable districts in an effort ostensibly intended to give racial
minorities control of dedicated school districts. See Sam Dillon, Law To Segregate Omaha
Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A9 [hereinafter Dillon, Law]; Sam
Dillon, Schools Plan in Nebraska Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at A17; Rick
Montgomery, Omaha Schools: Divide and Conquer?, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at A7.
The only African American state senator in Nebraska, Ernie Chambers, sponsored the plan
and argued that it was necessary to "carve] our area out of Omaha Public Schools and
establish[] a district over which we would have control." Dillon, Law, supra (quoting Neb.
State Sen. Ernie Chambers); see also Kathleen A. Bergin, Mixed Motives: Regarding Race and
Racial Fortuity, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 271-72 (2006) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, SILENT
COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL
REFORM (2004)) (discussing the Chambers plan).
1so. Cf Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1 (2006)
(describing how diversity across localities produces political innovation); Heather K.
Gerken, Dissenting By Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745, 1759-74 (2005) (arguing that outlying
dissent improves the quality of the marketplace of ideas); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REv. 243, 288-90 (2005) (arguing that the
"polyphony" of disaggregated authority supports plurality, dialogue, and redundancy).
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discourage political competition and thus further diminish turnout. ',18
Guinier's argument is intuitive and has been influential, as reflected in recent
skepticism about the VRA, but it also is generally untested as an empirical
proposition. Empirical work thus far has focused on the policy effects of
majority-minority districts and the consequences for minority interests in the
legislature,1"' but with few exceptions, it has neglected the study of process-
oriented values and the effects on the democratic experience for residents of
majority-minority districts. The empirical focus on outcomes, to the neglect of
process, mirrors the theoretical focus on outcomes rather than process-a
theoretical focus that the Article attempts to complicate. However, new
research in political science suggests that racial minorities represented by racial
minorities tend to be more civically engaged and to participate politically at
higher rates. The empirical evidence on the issue of minority participation in
majority-minority districts appears, if anything, contrary to Guinier's
expectations.
With respect to Latino communities in particular, empirical studies find
that majority-minority districts do not discourage participation or depress
turnout as Guinier fears, and instead help mobilize Latinos and increase Latino
turnout. 8 Although Latinos are less likely to vote than Anglo whites in
general, Latinos living in a majority-Latino district are significantly more likely
to turn out to vote on election day, controlling for other relevant factors. 18 4
181. GUINIER, supra note 177, at 85; see also Phil Duncan, Minority Districts Fail To Enhance
Turnout, Si CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 798 (1993); Phil Duncan, New Minority Districts: A
Conflict of Goals, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2010 (1993).
182. See, e.g., supra note 19 (citing studies on the ideological impact of majority-minority
districts).
183. See Matt A. Barreto, Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-
Minority Districts on Latino Turnout, 98 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 65, 74 (2004) ("Latinos vote more
when in a majority-Latino district, contrary to the expectations of those who expected or
feared minority demobilization."); Gary M. Segura & Nathan D. Woods, Majority-Minority
Districts, Co-Ethnic Candidates, and Mobilization Effects, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT
REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 133,
141 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007) (concluding that "the effect of living in districts with greater
Latino population is mobilizing for Latinos"). But see Kimball Brace et al., Minority Turnout
and the Creation of Majority-Minority Districts, 23 AM. POL. Q 19o, 192-200 (1995) (reporting
that over-time comparison suggests that minority turnout increases in majority-minority
districts but that cross-sectional analyses yield mixed results).
184. See Barreto et al., supra note 183, at 70-74; Segura & Woods, supra note 183, at 141-43. Of
course, there are many important forms of political participation besides voting that deserve
consideration for purposes of democratic contestation. See VERBA ET AL., supra note 131, at 37-
48 (surveying the range of political participation); see also Michael S. Kang, Counting on
Initiatives?: An Empirical Assessment, 4 ELECTION L.J. 217 (2005) (reviewing JOHN G.
MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW (2004); DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT,
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What is more, Latinos who live in overlapping majority-Latino districts at
multiple levels of government-for instance, majority-Latino districts for both
state legislative and congressional elections-are even more likely to vote than
Latinos who live in a majority-Latino district at only one level of
government. 8 ' The boost to political participation likely extends beyond voter
turnout alone. For instance, Latinos tend to be underrepresented at community
policing meetings when they constitute only a minority within a
neighborhood, but participate in large numbers when they constitute the
majority within a neighborhood. 
86
Although empirical research on majority-minority districts for African
Americans is more mixed, the social science literature generally finds higher
levels of political participation by African Americans in jurisdictions of
minority empowerment."7 Much of this literature focuses on municipal politics
in majority-minority cities, but nonetheless, a recent study finds that majority-
minority districts do not discourage political participation by African
Americans and exhibit higher African American turnout by a statistically
significant margin in four of eight states examined. 88 Moreover, African
Americans are significantly more likely to take the additional participatory step
of contacting their congressperson if their representative is an African
American, controlling for other considerations.89 More empirical study is
needed with regard to the participatory effects of majority-minority districting
EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE (2004)) (discussing different political science measures for political
participation and civil society).
185. See Barreto et al., supra note 183, at 72; see also Brace et al., supra note 183, at 197 (finding a
similar result for nested African American districts).
186. See ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING URBAN DEMOCRACY 125-27
(2004).
187. See F. Glenn Abney & John D. Hutcheson, Jr., Race, Representation, and Trust, 45 PUB.
OPINION Q. 91 (1981); Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Race, Sociopolitical
Participation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377 (1990); Susan E. Howell &
Deborah Fagan, Race and Trust in Government, 52 PUB. OPINION Q_. 343 (1988); see also David
A. Bositis, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts and Black and Hispanic Legislative
Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LEARNING FROM THE
PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 9 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998); D. Stephen Voss & David
Lublin, Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Congressional Elections, 29
AM. POL. RES. 141 (2001).
188. See Claudine Gay, The Effect ofBlack Congressional Representation on Political Participation, 95
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 589, 594-99 (2001); see also Brace et al., supra note 183, at 196-200
(finding similar turnout increases in the general election for state house districts but not for
congressional or state senate districts).
189. See Claudine Gay, Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship
Between Citizens and Their Government, 46 AM. J. POL. ScI. 717, 728-29 (2002).
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for both African Americans and Latinos at the primary election stage, rather
than the general election.' 9° Past work has examined voter turnout exclusively
in the general election, rather than the primary election where electoral
competition ought to be greater in majority-minority districts. Still, whatever
the speculative loss in democratic contestation from reduced partisan
competition in majority-minority districts, the empirical literature suggests
that an overall net gain in terms of democratic contestation may result from
sheltering minority voters from the politics of racial polarization. The minority
community could be liberated from discursive polarization and empowered to
enjoy higher levels of political participation and engagement under majority-
minority arrangements.
Although majority-minority districts are clearly designed foremost to
accommodate the preferences of minority voters, the benefits from breaking
free of the static discourse of racial polarization also might accrue to the white
community.' 9' Of course, white voters under conditions of racial polarization
do not benefit in the zero-sum game of political representation and pluralist
politics. Racial minority voters ultimately control who is elected from majority-
minority districts. However, the basic normative shift offered here is from a
pluralistic focus on which groups get what from politics, to a new focus on
what type and tenor of politics result from the process of democratic
contestation. A focus on democratic contestation helps identify the fact that,
even if white voters lose ground from the standpoint of political representation,
they may benefit from the changed quality of political discourse resulting from
19o. One might expect a basic tradeoff between electoral competition in the primary and general
elections with corresponding effects on voter turnout, such that even if turnout decreases for
a less competitive general election, it should increase on average for the more competitive
primary election in a majority-minority district. See Persily, supra note 33, at 661-62.
However, empirical work in political science thus far focuses exclusively on general elections
and likely understates the net increase in participation in majority-minority districts. In
addition, for purposes of gauging democratic contestation, it would be useful to consider
other measures of political participation and civic engagement besides voting and turnout.
See, e.g., VERBA ET AL., supra note 131, at 37-48 (describing a diverse range of political
participation and arguing against a narrow focus on voting and turnout).
191. A robust line of empirical research on ethnic heterogeneity points in this direction, though a
full exploration of its implications extends far beyond this Article. In short, empirical
research across a wide range of social contexts and participatory measures finds ethnic
heterogeneity negatively associated with civic engagement and political participation. See
generally Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First
Century: The 2oo6Johan Skytte Prize Lecture, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 149-51 (2007)
(surveying studies and concluding that inhabitants of ethnically diverse communities tend
to withdraw from collective life).
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a healthier process of democratic contestation now freed from the trap of racial
polarization that affects all sides.
As a consequence, location in a majority-minority district may have a
positive influence on many white citizens. In the usual politics of racial
polarization, a wide body of psychology research explains that white voting
cohesion under conditions of racial polarization is motivated, at least in
significant part, by considerations of group rivalry and primitive drives to
subordinate and advance one's social group status.' 92 However, in majority-
minority districts where the racial minority will invariably attain descriptive
representation, white voters no longer need to fixate squarely on group status
and are freed to view politics in other ways. White voters, who as a general
matter are not as cohesive as minority voters, 19 may freely engage in the
politics of majority-minority districts and reimagine politics along new lines.
This freedom might help explain why political scientists find that "race-
conscious redistricting seems often to reduce racial polarization and bloc voting
and to make white voters 'more likely to consider black and Hispanic
candidates."' 94 Majority-minority districts feature nuanced "supply-side"
politics that frequently feature cross-racial alliances between white and
minority voters. 9 s The politics of racial polarization, in surprising ways, is
asymmetrical. Whites are regularly invited to become influential voters in
majority-minority districts in ways that minority voters outside of majority-
minority districts usually are not.' 96
It is important to note that majority-minority districting, while relieving
the pressures inherent in racial polarization, does not squelch discussion of race
outside the politics of the district. The use of majority-minority districting is
not intended to, and does not, silence extradistrict discussion of race. It actually
gives formal recognition to its political salience. 97 In practice, by facilitating
192. See McAdams, supra note 162, at 1044-62 (reviewing the psychology literature).
193. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 117, at 1224. See generally Grofman, supra note 142, at 43-
67.
194. See Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REv. 1697, 1723 (1999) (citing
examples). It is important to recognize, however, that other studies find that political
participation by whites in majority-minority districts tends to decrease. See Barreto et al.,
supra note 183; Gay, supra note 189.
195. CANON, supra note 144, at 93-142.
196. See id. at 137-42.
197. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483,
506-07 (1993) (articulating a theory of expressive harm from the creation of majority-
minority districts).
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the election of minority spokespeople to the legislature and positions of public
prominence, majority-minority districting does more to elevate issues of racial
importance across the larger statewide and national debate, and in a more
nuanced and sophisticated fashion, than would the intradistrict politics of
racial polarization." However, majority-minority districting may permit
discussion of race, without permitting race wholly to dominate voting,
discourse, and political alignment in a way that paralyzes democratic
contestation. That is, majority-minority districting serves to mitigate the
damaging effects of racial polarization on political discourse and democratic
contestation, but it does so - importantly - without denying the importance of
race in politics.
To be sure, none of this is to say that electoral competition is not important
under a theory of democratic contestation as a general matter. In most cases,
the spur of electoral competition is a central means for achieving the primary
goal of incentivizing political leaders to engage the public in a process of
democratic contestation. However, as I argue and the empirical literature
suggests, electoral competition is not always the best means for fostering
democratic contestation under the exceptional circumstances of racial
polarization. True as well, electoral competition is normally the best means of
ensuring policy responsiveness to the median voter in the relevant community,
as candidates gravitate toward her median preferences in hope of winning
elections.' 99 But under the VRA, where the relevant community is the racial
minority, the dismantling of majority-minority districts in favor of general
electoral competition will hardly enhance policy responsiveness to the minority
community's median preferences in the district. Quite the opposite, the
majority-minority district guarantees electoral outcomes in the control of the
minority community, and remaining concerns about electoral dissatisfaction
and responsiveness are likely to be transferred to the party primaries instead of
the general election. 00
198. See Gerken, supra note 102, at 1134 (noting that minority legislators can serve as
"conversational entrepreneurs" in promoting awareness of their group concerns (quoting
BENNETr, supra note 72, at 36-37)); Karlan, supra note lo, at 98-99 (arguing that legislative
fora offer special opportunities for pluralist bargaining and deliberation on minority issues).
199. See generally Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23
(1948) (introducing the median voter theorem).
200. See Persily, supra note 33, at 661-62 (discussing the tradeoff between competition in the
primary and general election). A further argument is that dismantling majority-minority
districts and replacing them with "coalition districts," see infra Section III.C, enhances policy
responsiveness to the racial minority by increasing the likelihood that its political party will
win the legislature. Even assuming that the correct unit of analysis is the whole legislature
instead of the individual district, there is a fierce social scientific debate about whether the
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B. LULAC and Democratic Contestation
Viewed through a theory of democratic contestation, the politics of the
Voting Rights Act as played out in LULAC appear in a very different light.
Samuel Issacharoff and Ellen Katz are troubled by the anticompetitive effects of
the VRA, predetermining electoral competition in favor of Democrats in VRA-
protected districts. °1 When the focus shifts, however, from electoral
competition to democratic contestation -a broader, more robust conception of
political competition -the protections of the VRA appear less threatening and
more energizing overall to political discourse.
The deeper goals of democratic politics are better served by shifting
normative focus to a theory of democratic contestation, as outlined here.
Democratic contestation, more so than electoral competition, connects with a
richer notion of political competition in which rivalry among political leaders
stimulates debate, offers choices to the public, and gives life to political affairs.
The debate over the VRA requires a deeper exposition of politics,
representation, and competition that a theory of democratic contestation can
help develop.
If Ellen Katz correctly identifies a principal concern in LULAC about the
VRA's effect on competitive politics, it is clear that LULAC was confused. The
Court in LULAC viewed electoral safety with suspicion, as an obstacle to
political participation and engagement. However, the electoral safety of
majority-minority districts actually makes them the most promising way to
regenerate healthy political participation and advance civic engagement,
particularly among the racial minority, as i have shown. if the Court hoped to
emphasize "engagement over security,' 20 2 the Court should have unequivocally
endorsed the use of the VRA to break up patterns of racial polarization that
freeze into place what amounts to a racial stasis between white and minority
communities in terms of democratic contestation. District 23 would be worth
protecting as a safe majority-minority district under the VRA, even now after
Bonilla's subsequent ouster in 2006 and even if the district fails to continue the
partisan dueling praised beforehand in LULAC. Safe majority-minority
coalitional strategy is actually successful in practice as a matter of substantive policy. See
supra note 19. Moreover, the strategy is inherently risky for the racial minority, which may
end up controlling neither the district nor the legislature. Just so, the coalitional strategy
backfired in the Georgia redistricting of Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), where it
was most prominently featured. See Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the
Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 29 (2004).
201. See Issacharoff, supra note 6; Katz, supra note 16, at 1165-66.
202. Katz, supra note 16, at 1181.
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districts, under traditional VRA methodology, already served the Court's
participatory goals, consonant with a theory of democratic contestation. The
Court's effort to promote those goals in LULAC, through a new emphasis on
electoral competition, is unnecessary and misguided.
What is more, the implicit requirement in LULAC that majority-minority
districts be electorally competitive for VRA recognition is actually
counterproductive to these goals of democratic contestation. Majority-minority
districts, notwithstanding their electoral noncompetitiveness in the general
election, are valuable in liberating the process of democratic contestation, but
the Court in LULAC misunderstands this counterintuitive dynamic. By
instituting a new emphasis on electoral competition, the Court may discourage
safe majority-minority districts and thus their healthy promotion of the
Court's own participatory goals. Ironically, the Court's participatory goals were
better served by traditional VRA methodology before LULAC than by
LULAC's doctrinal modifications apparently designed to serve those goals.
Notwithstanding the rest of the Court's reasoning about the VRA, the
Court's handling of new District 25, announcing a new VRA requirement that
majority-minority districts be "culturally compact,"2 3 may be the most
troubling element of LULAC under a theory of democratic contestation. 0 4
Here, the Court echoed the antiessentialism of Shaw v. Reno2°s in reviewing the
permissibility of new District 25, a majority-Latino district created as an offset
to prevent vote dilution under the VRA. The Court concluded that the district
contained not a single cohesive political community, but two separate Latino
communities for the purposes of the VRA. The Court thus broke unexpectedly
from precedent that defined a minority community as politically cohesive
under the VRA if the community shared collective voting preferences in favor
of the same candidates for office. But again, a theory of democratic contestation
helps understand the Court's mistakes about race and the VRA in L ULAC.
Although the Latino residents of District 25 voted cohesively, the district
was, in Daniel Ortiz's words, not "culturally compact. '' ,, 6 Quoting the district
court's findings of fact, the Court noted that the "Latino communities at the
opposite ends of District 25 have divergent 'needs and interests,' owing to
'differences in socio-economic status, education, employment, health, and
203. Ortiz, supra note 60, at 50.
204. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2619 (2006).
205. 509 U.S. 630, 642-52 (1993). See generally Gerken, supra note 31, at 1718-20 (describing the
concerns about essentialization in Shaw, defined as "the drawing of inferences about an
individual's substantive preferences based on her group membership").
2o6. Ortiz, supra note 6o, at 50.
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other characteristics."'2 7  District 25, as a result, spanned "disparate
communities of interest, ' '2o8 rather than a single political community, as a
result of "the enormous geographical distance separating the Austin and
Mexican-border communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests
of these populations."'0 9 The heterogeneity of District 25 rendered it
impermissibly noncompact under the VRA.
The Court's justification for its cultural compactness requirement appeared
to flow from an antiessentialist imperative that cautioned against assuming
"from a group of voters' race that they 'think alike, share the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls."'" 10 That is, the VRA
does not permit political grouping of minority citizens simply because they
vote together as a bloc under conditions of racially polarized voting. Political
grouping may be warranted, according to LULAC's cultural compactness
reasoning, only when a district features cultural homogeneity that justifies
bundling together members of the same race on independent grounds. There
must be independent indicia, apart from bloc voting, that bind together the
community in terms of socioeconomic, education, employment, health, and
geographic considerations, among other things.
Under a theory of democratic contestation, LULAC's dubious insistence on
cultural compactness is misguided. The baseline requirement of bloc voting
characterized by racial polarization is a necessary trigger for VRA intervention
and was unchanged by LULAC. Both before and after LULAC, a VRA remedy
applies only when minority voters are frustrated politically along racial lines.
But LULAC may require, separate from racially polarized voting, a new
requirement of cultural homogeneity. LULAC may mean that "[s]tates might
not then have VRA obligations to create districts that, for example, bring
together urban and rural minorities, or suburban and city ones, even when
voting is racially polarized." 1' LULAC here goes terribly wrong.
With the goal of promoting political vibrancy and engagement, the last
thing the Court ought to require is cultural homogeneity. Cultural
homogeneity, or cultural compactness, would limit the space for political
differentiation within the minority community. It is cultural heterogeneity, not
207. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2613 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 451, 502, 512 (E.D. Tex. 2004)).
2o. Id. at 2618 (quoting Session, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 512).
2og. Id. at 2619.
210. Id. at 2618 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)); see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at
647 (criticizing as impermissible stereotyping the purposeful districting together of
individuals with "little in common with one another but the color of their skin").
211. Pildes, supra note 14, at 1146.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
homogeneity, that provides opportunities for democratic contestation. Cultural
heterogeneity creates lines of differentiation and divisions of interest that invite
political leaders to campaign for strategic realignment of political coalitions
within the minority community. If, for example, District 25 contains distinct
cultural communities, one in Austin and one along the Rio Grande, the
sociopolitical differentiation between those communities offers the promise of
democratic contestation and rivalry within the district going forward. District
25 might feature ongoing contestation for hearts and minds among Latino
leaders striving to convince residents to divide along socioeconomic,
educational, employment, health, and geographic lines -the dimensions the
Court recites in LULAC as relevant for cultural homogeneity. Every such
cleavage offers another line of differentiation along which leaders can appeal,
challenging people to consider it as politically central. Every cleavage and
difference offers fuel for democratic contestation.
The Court ought not to limit VRA enforcement to instances of cultural
homogeneity in the name of political competition. Rather, the Court should
ambitiously seek out cultural heterogeneity when enforcing the VRA, and in
the process, activate the diversity -and thus potential for robust democratic
contestation -within minority communities currently shackled by racial
polarization. Connecting back to the Court's interest in political vibrancy and
engagement, certainly the worst prescription would be intense homogeneity
along socioeconomic, educational, employment, health, and geographic lines,
leaving few prospects for political realignment along lines other than race.
Recent empirical work helps illustrate this prospect. Rates of civic participation
in local affairs are significantly lower in economically homogeneous cities than
economically diverse ones." ' Studies reveal that residents of economically
homogeneous cities were significantly less likely to be interested in local
politics than residents of economically diverse cities, even after controlling for
other factors, and were significantly less likely to vote in local elections or be
involved with their community board. 3 The Court's insistence on economic
homogeneity, for instance, in minority communities under the VRA therefore
may lead to less political engagement and participation than would be likely to
blossom in more heterogeneous, culturally noncompact ones.
By self-consciously seeking out a vision of cultural homogeneity, the Court
heads down the path of trying to define for the minority community the
content of its political identity and constitution. By focusing on, for example,
212. See J. Eric Oliver, The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation,
43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 186, 187-88 (1999). See generally J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA
(2001).
213. See Oliver, supra note 212, at 199-204.
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geographic or socioeconomic commonality in a model for required cultural
compactness, the Court presumes that those commonalities are salient, perhaps
determinative, in the community's political self-definition. But why so? The
process of democratic contestation properly allows the community, in a
contingent interaction between leaders and the public, to decide how it will
constitute itself politically. By acting on a particular theory of cultural
homogeneity, the Court itself makes explicit its audacious assumptions about
how the Latino communities in Districts 23 and 25 should and will develop
politically.
Ironically, the Court's antiessentialism in LULAC, and earlier in Shaw v.
Reno, was expressly motivated by caution about preempting the self-
constitution of racial minorities and presuming it along racial lines.21 4 LULAC
cites with approval Shaw's prohibition on "assum[ing] from a group of voters'
race that they 'think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the
same candidates at the polls.""'2 " Just so, the Court in LULAC concludes that it
would disserve the VRA's purposes to uphold District 25, which combines two
far-flung Latino communities, "by failing to account for the differences
between people of the same race. ,,,6 That is, the Court worried about
affirming essentializing assumptions about how voters, diverse along many
dimensions, will decide to constitute their political identities.
However, the Court's spirit of antiessentialism, expressed in LULAC, is
undermined by LULAC's putatively antiessentialist methods. The Court's
direction on cultural compactness threatens to do exactly what it cautioned
against in LULAC itself and Shaw v. Reno before it. LULAC, by imposing a
requirement of cultural homogeneity, threatens to preempt democratic
contestation. Requiring cultural homogeneity under the VRA essentializes the
minority community's political identity, not along racial lines, but along
whatever dimensions the Court selects as critical to cultural homogeneity. If
anything, judicial agnosticism about the right measure of cultural homogeneity
or heterogeneity is more consistent with the core of the Court's antiessentialist
214. See Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right To Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REv. 491,
516-27 (2000) (attributing to the Court the belief that race-based voting classifications
preempt political self-constitution).
a15. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Johnson, 515 U.S. at 920); see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
Justice Kennedy and the Court continued along these antiessentialist lines last Term. See
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2796-97 (2007)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2767 (majority opinion) (arguing that race-
conscious government action "demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by
ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting ice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000))).
216. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2618.
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concerns. Broad antiessentialism aspires that political alignments ought to be
determined by a robust political process of democratic contestation, not by
judicial or other government design. Ironically, LULAC's novel requirement of
cultural homogeneity runs headlong into the antiessentialist purposes the
Court intends it to serve in the first place.
C. The Mistake of Coalition Districts and Their Misguided Popularity
Given the emphasis on counteracting the effect of racial polarization, it
might seem intuitive that a theory of democratic contestation would also
generally favor coalition districts. Coalition districts, while not majority-
minority districts as a matter of population, allow racial minority voters to
control election outcomes by virtue of their cohesive bloc voting in the party
primary.1 7 Minority voters could defeat racially polarized opposition from
whites by unifying behind a single candidate in the party primary, almost
always the Democratic primary, where they actually constitute a voting
majority. In the right situation, enough white Democrats would be willing to
vote for the minority Democrat over the Republican in the general election to
provide the winning margin, even if the same candidate did not attract white
support in the primary. ,8 Coalition districts, by requiring minority voters to
attract the support of sympathetic white voters inside their districts, induce the
construction of necessary biracial coalitions to elect the minority candidate of
choice. This deemphasis of race might seem at first glance consonant with the
values underlying a theory of democratic contestation, but in a way that cuts
against majority-minority districting.
Before LULAC, the Court for these reasons had praised coalition districts
and generally emphasized a preference for normal politics in which minority
voters would not be "immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and trade to
find common political ground."21 In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court's most
recent VRA decision before LULAC, the Court unified in support of VRA
recognition of coalition districts." Just as coalition districts seem to
encourage, the Court hoped that minority voters would be "able to form
217. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 492-93 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); Metts v.
Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 11 (lst Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Grofman et al., supra
note 19, at 1407-09; Pildes, supra note 48, at 1534-39.
218. See Pildes, supra note 48, at 1534-35.
219. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
220. 539 U.S. at 482-84, 492-93.
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coalitions with voters from other racial and ethnic groups."22' A scholarly
consensus applauded coalition districts and the Court's decision in Ashcroft
effectively endorsing them."' Furthermore, after Ashcroft and immediately
before LULAC, Congress accepted the Court's position on coalition districts by
letting stand that aspect of Ashcroft in the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
Act of 2006."3
An oddity of LULAC is that the Court looked askance at the claims of
voters in old District 24, which appeared to be a coalition district under the
VRA. When the Court was presented its first chance after congressional
renewal to express approval of coalition districts, the Court rejected the
coalition district claims offered in LULAC.2 4 Old District 24 seemed to be a
classic example of a coalition district as the theory would have it. African
American voters constituted only a quarter of the district's total voting-age
population but made up almost two-thirds of the Democratic primary
electorate, sufficient to control the Democratic primary." African American
voters consistently elected their preferred candidate, Martin Frost, in the party
primary and then, in a safe Democratic district, managed to elect Frost to office
in general election after general election. Although a large majority of white
voters voted against the minority community's candidates of choice in District
24, Frost won office with overwhelming African American support in
combination with just enough votes from white Democrats.2 6 The district thus
offered textbook operation of the coalitional logic that the Court earlier praised
in Ashcroft-one in which "minority citizens are able to form coalitions with
voters from other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority
within a single district in order to elect candidates of their choice."2 7 However,
221. Id. at 481 (quoting Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1020).
222. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 503, 531-39 (2004); Pildes, supra note 6, at 92-98.
223. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 1O9-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (West 20o6)); see also Persily, Promise and Pitfals, supra note
21, at 236-37 (noting tension between the House and Senate reports but concluding that
coalition districts would be protected under the renewed VRA).
224. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2625-26 (2006).
225. Id. at 2624.
226. See 1 Joint Appendix at 56, 92-103, LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (Nos. 05-204, 05-254, 05-276, 05-
439), 2006 WL 64437 (report of Allan J. Lichtman on Voting-Rights Issues in Texas
Congressional Redistricting).
227. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 481 (2003) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1020 (1994)).
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presented with a classic case of just such an enduring biracial coalition, the
Court in LULAC chose not to save old District 24.
Even more oddly, the Court also contradicted its earlier reasoning from
Ashcroft by questioning whether Martin Frost was a legitimate candidate of
choice for District 24 at all.228 In Ashcroft, the Court defended coalition districts
under the VRA despite the fact that coalition districts may produce elected
candidates who "may not represent perfection to every minority voter. '2 9 But
in LULAC, the Court insisted that the absence of primary challenges to the
incumbent Martin Frost undercut the genuineness of his undisputed support
among African American voters. Suggesting that African Americans might have
supported an African American candidate in the primary against Frost,20 the
Court insisted that the African American voters had only "the ability to
influence the outcome between some candidates, none of whom is their
candidate of choice. '2 3  This resulting ambivalence by the Court-uniform
approval for coalition districts in Ashcroft followed by contradictory hostility
toward them in LULAC-reflects fundamental normative confusion about
coalition districts among the Justices.
Unmoored from a theory of democratic contestation, such ambivalence
demonstrates the Court's uncertainty about the precise harm under the VRA
that coalition districts purportedly resolve. Old District 24 embodied what the
Court had earlier idealized about coalition districts: a multiracial alliance that
one state senator testified was a "good coalition ... of African-Americans,
Hispanics, and Anglos working together." 32 But the Court in LULAC seemed
intuitively bothered by something else about the district. As Ellen Katz noted,
the Court appeared suspicious of the lack of electoral competition in the
district, preferring instead what the Court saw as the vibrancy among Latinos
in old District 23. The Court noted that in District 23, Latino voter registration
had increased, and it was "Latinos who were becoming most politically
228. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2648 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 481 (quoting De Grandy, 512 U.S. at o2o).
230. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625. Of course, undisputed testimony in the LULAC record explained
that Frost may not have faced primary challengers precisely because he was genuinely the
African American voters' candidate of choice. See, e.g., 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 226, at
241-43 (testimony of Roy Brooks); id. at 238-41 (testimony of Ron Kirk); id. at 256-57
(testimony of Royce West). Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk testified that he "[did] not believe that
you could elect an African-American candidate, including perhaps [him]self, against
Martin." Id. at 241.
231. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2625.
232. 1 Joint Appendix, supra note 226, at 260 (testimony of Royce West).
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active."233 By contrast, the Court questioned the lack of competition in old
District 24, even though under the Court's precedent, there was no basis for
questioning whether Frost, who had consistently received African American
support, was genuinely the racial minority's candidate of choice.
New reference to a theory of democratic contestation helps clarify the
Court's quandary regarding coalition districts. The critical harm of racial
polarization that the VRA targets, as I have argued, is the resulting discursive
polarization paralyzing the process of democratic contestation. Viewed in this
light, coalition districts are responsive to the VRA's normative aims only if they
release the pressures of racial polarization. The question is not simply whether
coalition districts permit the racial minority to win the district. Majority-
minority districts more safely ensure victory for the racial minority. Instead,
coalition districts are preferable to majority-minority districts if they improve
opportunities for democratic contestation beyond the single axis of race. The
fact by itself that coalition districts seem to encourage biracial coalitions is
nondecisive as a normative matter. Coalition districts are preferable only if they
encourage a broader diversity of democratic contestation under the challenging
conditions of racial polarization, most prominently by enabling minority voters
to align nonracially.
Under a theory of democratic contestation, then, the badly overlooked
problem with coalition districts is that they do not allow minority voters to
realign and divide among themselves in politics and deliberation. Coalition
districts depend on racial cohesion for effectiveness in electing minority
candidates of choice. The very premise of coalition districts, in fact, is that
minority voters remain tightly together on candidates and issues not only at
the stage of the general election, but crucially at the stage of the party primary
as well. If the minority community divides at the primary stage, then its
candidate of choice likely will lose in the party primary, defeated by the
candidate supported by their white copartisans in the primary. 34 In other
words, coalition districts do not alter the need for the racial minority to remain
tightly cohesive and thus shun consideration of issues and policies that might
break up its necessary pattern of bloc voting. Even if minority voters are forced
to ally with sympathetic white voters, coalition districts do not encourage the
minority community to explore intragroup disagreement.
233. LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2622.
a34. Cf Janai S. Nelson, White Challengers, Black Majorities: Reconciling Competition in Majority-
Minority Districts with the Promise of the Voting Rights Act, 95 GEo. L.J. 1287, 1300-01 (2007)
(discussing the risk that entry of multiple African American candidates who split the African
American vote in a majority-minority district allows a white candidate to win office).
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In fact, coalitions intensify the need for cohesiveness and racial unity
among the minority group. The very logic of coalition districts requires the
continuation of strong in-group cohesion among minority voters that does not
break up the stasis of polarization and invigorate the process of democratic
contestation. Coalition districts thus discourage the type of primary challenge,
and concomitant fraternal debate within parties and racial groups, that the
Court seemed to desire from old District 24. The electoral insecurity of
coalition districts, which forces the coalitional compromises that the Court
once favored, also removes the secure margin that allows the racial minority to
experiment with ideas and seriously entertain internal debate.
It is important to remember that coalition districts are used to satisfy the
VRA only under the predicate conditions of racial polarization. Coalition
districts do not counteract the basic fact of racial polarization. To the degree
that minority voters can elect their candidate of choice without constituting a
voting majority, the basic precondition of racial polarization simply does not
exist, and the VRA does not apply in the first place. True, coalition districts can
be constructed to contain a number of marginally sympathetic white
Democrats who are willing to cross racial lines and support the racial
minority's candidate of choice in the general election, even if not the primary
election. But the racial minority, the community of interest for purposes of the
VRA, must not break from its pattern of racial bloc voting, or it will lose
control of the district. Coalition districts might superficially weaken
polarization among white voters, but racial minority voters are almost always
more racially polarized and cohesive than their white counterparts.23 Contrary
to the goals of democratic contestation, coalition districts do not permit the
racial minority to consider anything other than strict in-group cohesion and
uniformity.
Just so, the coalition politics of old District 24 likely discouraged internal
debate and division within the African American community. Evidence at trial
bore out that African American candidates might have been able to win old
District 24, perhaps even defeat Frost in the Democratic primary, but that no
serious primary challenge had ever been mounted against Frost.236 Frost had
been a solid representative for African American voters in his district, scoring a
ninety-four percent rating from the NAACP for his voting record, higher than
the average among African American Democrats.23 7 Nonetheless, the electoral
incentives discouraged any primary challenge to Frost from other serious
235. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 117, at 1223-24.
236. See supra notes 226-230.
237. See i Joint Appendix, supra note 226, at 107 (report of Allan J. Lichtman).
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contenders who might have split the African American vote. Drawing African
American votes away from Frost might only have opened the door for a
candidate far less preferable to African American voters, and more preferable to
white Democrats in the district, than either Frost or whatever African American
challenger who entered the primary against him. It may have been this
dynamic within the politics of old District 24, as a classic coalition district, that
bothered the Court in LULAC and drew the Court to focus so closely on the
absence of any past primary challenges, particularly from African American
candidates, in old District 24. That is, the Court in LULAC grasped at the
connection between the politics of coalition districts and the need for
democratic contestation, but it simply lacked the conceptual theory, which I
have attempted to provide here, to articulate the deeper rationale for the
surprising holdings that it produced in LULAC.
Georgia v. Ashcroft presented an odd circumstance in which the minority
community at least arguably supported the use of coalition districts instead of
majority-minority districts."' In fact, this assertion taken as fact by the Ashcroft
Court, is highly uncertain, as I have pointed out in earlier work 39 Although
minority elected officials supported the Ashcroft redistricting, a fact on which
the Court relied heavily, virtually all civil rights and community groups
representing African American voters opposed the Ashcroft redistricting and
filed an amicus curiae brief urging its reversal2 4' Coalition districts, if traded
for majority-minority districts for purposes of satisfying the VRA, are typically
less attractive to the minority group. As the Court acknowledged, coalition
districts require the minority group to compromise with other racial groups
and settle for candidates who "may not represent perfection to every minority
voter.''  Of course, Justice O'Connor relished the need for the racial minority
group to organize cohesively in coalition districts and attract marginal
copartisan support in the general election. 4" Coalition districts demand biracial
compromises just to hold the district safely, but the need for the racial minority
to remain unified precludes any possibility to think and align beyond race even
238. See Gerken, supra note 38, at 733 ("[T]here was relative unanimity among African American
representatives about the wisdom of the plan."); Pildes, supra note 6, at 96 (noting the
"nearly unanimous support of a large black political delegation").
239. See Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting
Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 667, 691-94 (2007); see also Karlan, supra note 200, at 33
(questioning community support among African Americans).
24o. See Brief of Georgia Coalition for the Peoples' Agenda as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (No. 02-182).
241. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 481 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)).
2p. Id. at 482-84.
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within the party. Coalition districts basically rule out the chance for the racial
minority to do anything but align tightly together behind a single candidate
throughout the entire electoral process. This necessary dictate has limiting,
unhealthy consequences on the character and tenor of democratic contestation
for the minority community.
The majority-minority district provides a necessary safe venue where
intragroup disagreement can be explored. The tight coincidence of race and
party in American politics, at least for Latinos and African Americans, requires
that this intragroup conflict play itself out within the Democratic Party, rather
than between the major parties?43 The political party is a critical venue for
democratic contestation to occur among the ideologically like-minded, and a
serious theory of democratic contestation demands intraparty debate in
addition to interparty conflict. Although political parties and interparty
competition serve as crucial mediating devices for average citizens to
understand politics, meaningful intraparty debate is also essential to give
political parties their substantive content as expressive associations in the first
place and meaningfully declare what they represent. 4
Intradistrict primary conflicts in majority-minority districts are well
positioned to host this type of democratic contestation within minority
communities. The party primary is a central venue for debate among
copartisans who are strategically bound to vote together and compromise over
their differences in the general election.4 General elections, by their nature,
concentrate on appeals aimed strategically at centrist voters, split between more
conservative and liberal partisans. In the general election, the cost of
intragroup and intraparty division is prohibitive because it would likely lead to
electoral defeat. The party primary, in a majority-minority district but not in a
coalition district, is where copartisans can explore their differences and redefine
their commitments without necessarily costing themselves the ultimate general
election.4 6 It is only in the majority-minority district where democratic
contestation within the minority group can be engaged without compromising
the group and its party's ultimate ability to elect their candidate of choice.
243. See generally FRYMER, supra note 22, at 87-119 (discussing the problem of electoral capture
within the Democratic Party that squelches interparty competition for minority votes).
244. See Kang, supra note 137, at 141-42; Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political
Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 805-20 (2001).
245. See Kang, supra note 137, at 141-44.
246. See id.
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CONCLUSION
A theory of democratic contestation offers a new normative guide for
healthy democratic politics and therefore provides a new perspective for
assessing the entire range of election law with the value of democratic
contestation at its center. A theory of democratic contestation complicates the
usual understanding about the value of competition by pushing up the level of
analysis from simple electoral competition to the deliberative competition
among leaders to challenge the public with important choices about what
politics it wants. As a result, a theory of democratic contestation should enrich
views about a diverse set of problems across election law. Just as a theory of
democratic contestation guides courts regarding the justifiability of majority-
minority districts under the VRA, it also may inform courts about the
constitutional justifiability (or impermissibility) of partisan gerrymanders or
the desirability of campaign finance reform.
Although this Article's focus has been on the judicial application of the
VRA, a theory of democratic contestation may provide even greater value to
legislatures and other policy-making institutions, particularly redistricting
commissions, than it does to courts. As this Article has argued, courts can and
should productively apply a theory of democratic contestation under the well-
established auspices of the VRA to shelter a space for democratic contestation
to flourish, where racial polarization would otherwise threaten to kill it off.
Nonetheless, there are fewer opportunities for courts, as nonlegislative bodies,
to apply an affirmative vision of democratic contestation in contexts such as
redistricting or campaign finance law. Courts generally act to strike down,
rather than initiate and affirmatively construct, electoral structures that might
be designed to cultivate certain forms of democratic contestation. 47 However,
policy-making institutions regularly make such choices and would be richly
informed by efforts to construct affirmative accounts of democratic
contestation. Just as we expect legislatures, and quasi-legislative institutions
like independent commissions, to decide among democratic values to promote
in deciding matters of election law, so too might we expect them to decide
among different varieties of democratic contestation to promote and, just as
importantly, to discourage.
Policy-making institutions vested with appropriate democratic legitimacy,
particularly redistricting commissions, could affirmatively design electoral
247. Courts may be institutionally ill-equipped to decide the value-laden and empirical questions
that an affirmative account of democratic contestation necessarily requires. See Kang, supra
note 239, at 686-99 (arguing that politically insulated institutions such as courts are poorly
suited for questions of democratic theory).
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structures to emphasize certain sociopolitical commonalities or differences.
Redistricting commissions, as they currently operate or have been proposed,
generally lack a substantive vision for healthy democratic politics even though
they are specifically intended to design the electoral structures within which
democratic politics are to proceed.248 A theory of democratic contestation offers
just such a substantive vision. Redistricting commissions could consider not
simply electoral competition, as many advocate, but the particular quality and
character of the democratic contestation to be pursued. Commissions could
decide, for instance, whether to choose along nonracial qualities such as
economic class or religion in the construction of legislative districts. Of course,
the same concerns regarding electoral entrenchment might apply as they do
with the putative promotion (or discouragement) of electoral competition. But
a theory of democratic contestation provides a vocabulary, and more
importantly, a sharper, more athletic theory, with greater conceptual clarity
about normative commitments, than the blunt tool that electoral competition
by itself provides.
248. See id. at 675-99 (describing redistricting commissions, actual and proposed, and their
challenges).
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